为什么湘军淮军和湘军哪个厉害楚军等在内战中表现出色的军队,却在

上传用户:oljnqgqcfc资料价格:5财富值&&『』文档下载 :『』&&『』学位专业:&关 键 词 :&&&&&权力声明:若本站收录的文献无意侵犯了您的著作版权,请点击。摘要:(摘要内容经过系统自动伪原创处理以避免复制,下载原文正常,内容请直接查看目录。)16~17世纪,中西部队都已将年夜量管状火器投入实战。但是,两边的军事成长却由此开端逐步走向了分歧的途径。为了最高效力地施展出其时火器的威力,东方部队开端以逻辑思想精心盘算若何在疆场上对之作最好的应用。这就使他们的战术、练习不再是小我经历基本上的客观产品,而逐步成为可以或许停止准确考量、评价并以之追求最好效力的治理和掌握方法。经由过程这类尽力,火器杀伤力获得了愈来愈充足的施展,马队的位置也因之逐步降低,没法再称雄疆场。反不雅其时明代部队,固然各类火器、车营战术名堂迭出,却年夜多为客观归纳的产品,并不是准确剖析论证的成果。俞年夜猷、戚继光等具有实战经历的优良将领所创建的战役、练习方法虽有必定的适用价值,却也都是小我军事禀赋的好手偶得,而并未成长成为尺度化的标准或许条例。因此历久以来,明代部队的战术及练习方法一向彷徨不前,未获得本质性的冲破,没法使火器施展出其真实的疆场后果。明清(金)交兵的汗青记载注解,前者根本上都是以一种异常凌乱和低效的方法来应用这些晚期枪炮,所以满族马队的弓马可以或许异常随意马虎地克服明代部队的火器。但是后来清军也照搬了敌手的方法来停止火器的战役与练习,是以异样未能成长出顺应于这类兵器的战术。由此可知,中国传统思想上的成绩应当是自明末以致晚清中国部队战术及练习程度落伍的一个症结缘由。这类汗青文明沉淀也仍然影响着晚清时代湘军战术及练习变更的深度。这场变更现实上是内忧内乱促动下,“经世”思潮在军事范畴的反应,所以湘军的战术、编制、练习等均本实在学适用的准绳。经过复古戚家军的战役练习方法,湘军一改绿营徒壮不雅瞻的“花法”,代之以适用的战术和严厉的平常操练。而经由过程内战的理论考验以后,又有进一步的更新创制,并发生了深远的影响。是以,湘军的战术及练习变更可以说是晚清中国部队在“经世致用”思惟推进下、于历久战斗理论中的一次自我更新,特别是为绾接东方、转向古代化途径铺下了基石。但是异样囿于传统思想方法,此一变更仍然逗留在小我的经历与直觉当中。从实战中可以清晰地看到,湘军分歧军队的战役方法常常是将领小我客观偏好的表示,并未对兵器机能、特色停止严厉剖析和准确盘算来完成战术及练习的标准化、尺度化。是以,湘军的战术、练习变更也就不会具有古代化的取向。虽表现了传统兵学在危机下的适用化,却不是一次划时期的冲破。淮军则在这个成绩上供给了更好的例证。战斗情势的须要,使其于进军上海以后便敏捷地接收了西式兵器和战役、练习办法。苏沪疆场的各次战斗注解,历久的实战确切令淮军在技战术方面产生了明显的变更,成长出一种融会中西的战术系统,成为中国汗青上第一支应用近代枪炮停止各军种协同战役的部队。但是年夜范围战事停止以后,淮军的战时经历并没有获得标准式的剖析研讨,并由之总结出近代火器的战役、练习条例,反而又涌现了将领自绘阵图、乃至诬捏阵式来停止战术练习的状态。一朝一夕,遂再度堕入传统行伍只顾不雅瞻、无俾现实的窠臼。另外,在传统认知形式的感化下,淮军将领不只没法从本身的战斗经历中成长出近代军事实际,乃至还没法真正懂得东方的军事思惟或理念。盛军统帅周哄传就是一个典范人物。作为一个具有趋新精力的将领,周哄传关于西式兵器、操法都很有兴致,也常常同东方教习交换。但在此进程中,他异常天然地以既有经历作为认知终点,以本身的懂得来从新归纳新思惟、新不雅点,使之相符本来的常识构造。是以不难懂得,周哄传用来练兵的“西法”已经是被过滤、选择和改革以后的产品,必定无形而无实。故其统帅下的盛军依然由传统的部队扶植不雅念和练习思绪所主导。这解释在缺少实战须要和磨练的情形下,传统思想方法的局限导致淮军即使设备先辈的兵器、聘任东方教习,也没法完成本身的古代化。甲午战胜所激发的激烈危机感,则迫使时工资追求更能处理实际成绩的方法,进而开端真正地依照“西法”本身的逻辑去对之停止进修。这类立场的变更在军事范畴表示得尤其显著。有人开端批评传统兵学平空诬捏、不实在用,转而积极引介东方部队的战役、练习办法作为中国部队改造的思惟资本。这就决议了甲午以后的“西法练兵”在本质上已分歧于以往枪炮操作、队列操练等外相,而是要年夜范围地模仿东方部队的治理、组织和练习形式,接收东方的军事实际、学说。袁世凯小站练兵恰是将此一趋向由群情酿成了实际。所以新建陆军的重要将领关于东方军事常识和实际都有相当水平的研讨。这就使该军在部队扶植上开端展示出一种正轨化的特点,技战术练习上则朝着尺度化和专业化的偏向成长,完整抛弃了各类玄虚的阵法,而是依据兵器的机能、特色和疆场情况来停止各类战役队形的练习;特殊是模仿实战前提下的反抗演习,更是有助于官兵真正懂得近代战役方法的现实价值。这些治理练习方法的改弦更张,其实也意味着一种思想不雅念的转型:中国部队第一次测验考试模拟东方部队,更多地以感性而非经历的方法来研讨、处置军事事务。这一点才是小站练兵之所以可称为中国部队古代化开始的症结地点。从这个演化进程可以看出,平易近族危机的赓续加重和由此所激化的适用心态,终究迫使晚清部队的战术及练习方法开端走出由传统思想不雅念所堆积而成的既有轨道,慢慢转入一条顺应于近代战斗请求的成长途径。由之可见,晚清战术及练习甚至全部部队的古代化现实上也就是一个可以称之为“换头脑”的思想不雅念转型过程。是以,必定具有显著的主动性和外源性,从而也决议了这必是一条艰苦弯曲、漫漫修远之路。这段汗青提示先人,部队古代化应当先从基本的地方亦即人的思想不雅念着手,方能令其成为一个自内而外、天然而然的过程。除此以外,晚清战术及练习的演化,也在必定水平上反应出其时社会思惟变迁的特色。愈来愈危机的实际成绩在赓续安慰时人将变更推向深刻并终究冲破传统思想不雅念约束的同时,也引诱他们愈发将眼光纠集于适用方面,并逐步以之作为评判和选择的尺度,进而招致以浮浅的方法进修东方军事文明,以功利的立场鄙薄传统文明。所以,晚清部队固然在赓续产生变更,但其精力信心却一落千丈,发生了深远的汗青影响。这也许也是晚清古代化的一个缩影。Abstract:From 16 to seventeenth Century, Chinese troops will have a large number of tubular firearms into combat. However, on both sides of the military growth has gradually moved toward the differences start from this way. In order to have the highest effect to display in the meantime firearm might, the eastern army began to logical thinking how well figured on the battlefield to make the best application. This makes their tactics, practice is no longer a personal experience, objective product basically, and gradually become the governance can be accurate considerations, and to pursue the best effectiveness evaluation and grasp the method. Through process this kind of effort, firearm lethality won the increasingly abundant display, Paolo Maldini's position is gradually reduced, can't again rule the roost on the battlefield. Anti indecent, in the meantime, the Ming Dynasty army, although all types of firearms, car battalion tactical tricks filed one after another, but mostly objectively summarized the product, and not accurate analysis results. Yu Nianye Yau, Qi, with combat experience of the excellent generals created battle, practice although the method has a certain practical value, are also personal military endowment players occasionally, and did not grow up become scale standards or regulations. So long-term since, the Ming Dynasty army tactics and training methods always hesitate, did not get the essence of broken, can't make firearm cast out the real battlefield consequences. Annotation is recorded in the history of the Ming and Qing Dynasties jiaobing (gold), the former is in a abnormal messy and inefficient method to apply the advanced guns, so the Manchu cavalry horse bow can perhaps abnormal casual sloppy, overcome the firearms of the Ming Dynasty army. But later Qing has copied the adversary method to stop the battles and practice of the firearm is strangely failed to grow to conform to this kind of weapon tactics. Thus it may be known, the Chinese traditional ideology results shall is from the end of the Ming Dynasty so that in the late Qing Dynasty Chinese troops tactics and practice of outdated a disease become attached by. This kind of historical and cultural precipitation still affects the late Qing Dynasty and change the depth of Hunan tactical exercises. The real change is internal strife actuation under, &the world&, the trend of thought in the field of military response, so Army Tactical, preparation and practice are the really applicable principle. After retro Qi army battle practice methods, the army changed the green camp acts strong indecent Zhan &flower&, with suitable tactics and the severity of the usual practice. And through the process of civil war theory test after another update created further, and has far-reaching influence. In the army's tactics and practice change can be said is in the late Qing Dynasty, Chinese forces &pragmatism& thinking in advance, to long-term combat theory in a self-renewal, especially for coiling the connected to the East, to the ancient way laid the cornerstone of. But also due to the traditional way of thinking, this change still linger on experience and intuition of the ego. You can clearly see from the actual combat, Hunan and divergence forces battle method is often the representation of general personal subjective preference, did not on the characteristics and function of the weapon stop strict analysis and accurate calculation to complete the tactics and practice of standardization and standardization. In Hunan, tactics and practice will not change with the orientation of the ancient. Although the performance is in the crisis of the traditional military science, but not an epoch-making breakthrough. In the performance of Huai supply a better example. To combat situations, so as to enter Shanghai after quickly received western weapons and battle practice way. Suhu the battlefield of the battle notes, long-term combat the exact make Huai produced significant changes in tactics, grow out of the tactical system of a kind of fusion of Chinese and Western cultures, become the history of China's first application in modern guns to stop the military campaign coordination troops. But after the cessation of the scope of the eve of the war, Huai wartime experiences, did not get standard type of analysis and study of the, and the summed up the modern firearms battle, practice regulations, instead and the emergence of generals since the draw diagrams, and falsely pinch matrix to stop the tactical exercises of the state. A short duration of time, then again fall into the traditional ranks only indecent, so the pattern of realistic looking. Also under the action of traditional forms of cognition, the Huai army generals not only can't from combat experience grow out of the modern military practice, and also can not really understand western military thought or idea. Sheng army commander Zhou vibe is a typical character. As a new energy generals with the trend of, weeks to about western weapons and operation method are in the mood to often with Eastern teach learning exchange. But in this process, he naturally to have abnormal experience as a cognitive end, with their own understanding to new ideas, new induction from a new point of view, the knowledge structure of the original. Is to is not difficult to understand, training for the week to &Lucifer& is already is filtered, choice and the reform of the products must be invisible and no real. The commander of the army forces still from the traditional Sheng construction idea and practice dominated thoughts. Explain this in lack of practical need and hone, the limitations of traditional way of thinking lead to Huai even equipment advanced weapons, the appointment of Oriental learning, also cannot finish the modernization itself. Sino-Japanese victory over excited by an intense sense of crisis, is forcing the pursuit of wages more ways to deal with practical problems, then began really in accordance with the logic of &Lucifer& itself to carries on the study. This kind of position changes in the military field that was particularly significant. Some people begin to criticize traditional tactical groundlessly slander the pinch, not really used, which, in turn, actively introduce Eastern army's campaign, the practice way as thoughts capital of the transformation of Chinese troops. This decision after the Sino Japanese War of
&Lucifer training& in essence has differences in previous gunnery, queue training foreign minister, but to large-scale imitation of the eastern army of the governance, organization and form of exercise, receiving Oriental martial practice, theory. Yuan Shikai is the way station training was a real trend by. Research on Oriental military knowledge and practical level are quite important so the new army generals. Which makes the army support troops began to show characteristics of a normal, technical and tactical exercises towards standardization and specialization of biased growth, complete abandon the strategies of all kings of mystery, but according to the weapon of the function, characteristics and the battlefield situation to stop all kinds of
imitate the actual condition of resistance exercise, is conducive to the officers and men really understand the practical value of the method of modern battle. These governance practice methods of gears, actually means a thought transformation: Chinese troops in the first test examination simulation Eastern army, more emotional and non experience method to research and disposal of military affairs. This is the reason why station training can be called the crux of China troops began in ancient times. From the evolution process can be seen, the ethnic crisis continuously increased, and thus the intensification of the applicable state of mind, eventually forcing troops in the late Qing Dynasty tactics and practice way to start out by traditional thought indecent read the accumulated existing track, slowly into a adaptation to modern battle request growth path. From the visible, ancient reality in late Qing Dynasty or even all forces and tactical exercises is also a can be called &in mind& the idea of concept transformation. Is, must have initiative and exogenous significantly, which also determines that will be a hard to bend, long road. The history suggested that their ancestors, the ancient forces should first from the idea of the basic place namely, indecent read set, ordered him to become a from the inside out, natural and natural process. In addition, the evolution of late Qing Dynasty tactics and practice, also reflects the changes of characteristics in the society at that time had a certain extent. Crisis is more and more the actual achievement in the ceaseless stimulation people will change toward profound and eventually break through traditional thinking concept constraints at the same time, but also to lure the they increasingly look mustered in application, and gradually to the evaluation and selection of the scale, and lead to shallow Oriental learning military civilization, to the utilitarian position scorn traditional civilization. So, although the change in the late Qing Dynasty forces continuously, but the confidence of their energy has plummeted, the history of far-reaching. Perhaps this is a microcosm of the ancient Qing dynasty.目录:摘要5-8Abstract8-10图表清单14-16绪论16-39&&&&一、选题缘起及意义16-18&&&&二、学术史回顾18-29&&&&&&&&(一) 相关理论研究综述18-20&&&&&&&&(二) 主题相关研究概览20-29&&&&三、概念、思路与方法29-39&&&&&&&&(一) 概念解释与说明29-32&&&&&&&&(二) 思路与目标32-37&&&&&&&&(三) 主要方法37&&&&&&&&(四) 重点与难点37-39第一章 沉沦:明清之际中国战术及训练方式的落后39-80&&&&第一节 明代后期战术及训练的发展:兼与西方比较39-52&&&&&&&&一、明代后期军队的战术及训练:以“戚家军”为例39-45&&&&&&&&二、16-17世纪西方战术及训练变革45-49&&&&&&&&三、不同的走向:中西比较及启示49-52&&&&第二节 满洲骑兵的崛起与称雄52-71&&&&&&&&一、满洲骑射战术及同明军的比较52-56&&&&&&&&二、骑射战术在明金交战中的完胜56-63&&&&&&&&三、明金(清)双方战术的调整63-71&&&&第三节 小结:骑射战术称雄的原因与影响71-80&&&&&&&&一、弓马战胜枪炮的一种解释71-75&&&&&&&&二、骑射称雄对清代战术发展的影响75-80第二章 回归:湘军的战术及训练变革80-114&&&&第一节 儒生变悍将:变革的思想背景80-88&&&&&&&&一、经世致用:传统兵学回归实际80-83&&&&&&&&二、义理之学:将帅志节的军事意义83-88&&&&第二节 编制、武器与基本战术88-99&&&&&&&&一、编制与武器简述88-91&&&&&&&&二、基本战术分析91-99&&&&第三节 实战表现与影响的扩展99-107&&&&第四节 小结:变革的意义与局限107-114第三章 转向:淮军改用“泰西阵法”114-190&&&&第一节 转变的背景114-123&&&&&&&&一、孤军入死地:苏沪战场的环境114-116&&&&&&&&二、李鸿章的个人经历与品性学养116-123&&&&第二节 淮军战术在实战中的变化123-162&&&&&&&&一、“泰西阵法”简述123-126&&&&&&&&二、参用西法:湘式战术中的新变化126-131&&&&&&&&三、融合中西:新战术初露端倪131-140&&&&&&&&四、自成体系:新战术粗具规模140-155&&&&&&&&五、平捻作战:新体系趋于完善155-162&&&&第三节 盛军小站练兵:淮军驻防时期的个案研究162-180&&&&&&&&一、编制结构与武备概况162-166&&&&&&&&二、基本战术及训练概述166-170&&&&&&&&三、问题透视:主导思想陈旧170-179&&&&&&&&四、症结之处:思维方式所限179-180&&&&第四节 小结:淮军现代化缘何功败垂成180-190第四章 激变:甲午之后的改弦更张——以新建陆军为个案190-241&&&&第一节 背景:甲午战后的思想震动190-193&&&&&&&&一、危机引发的思想亟变190-192&&&&&&&&二、军事领域的反思192-193&&&&第二节 袁世凯其人:主导者的特质193-201&&&&&&&&一、早年军事经历193-197&&&&&&&&二、个人行事风格197-201&&&&第三节 新建陆军的编制、训练及战术201-234&&&&&&&&一、编制与武备概况201-207&&&&&&&&二、军队建设与训练的新特点207-217&&&&&&&&三、基本战斗方式与演习概述217-234&&&&第四节 小结:危机催生的激变及其隐忧234-241第五章 总结:从思想文化角度解读晚清战术及训练演变241-255&&&&一、文化基因:传统思维方式的特点及其问题241-244&&&&二、历史积淀:晚清战术及训练变革的特征244-250&&&&三、以史为鉴:晚清军事现代化的启示与反思250-255参考文献255-270致谢270-272个人简介及攻读期成果272分享到:相关文献|帖子主题:为什么湘军和淮军外战能力相差这么大?
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为什么湘军和淮军外战能力相差这么大?
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在清朝末年的中,以曾国藩为首的湘军,以李鸿章为首的,都骁勇善战而闻名,打败了的军,歼灭了北方的捻军,支撑岌岌可危的大清达数十年之久。无论是湘军还是淮军,在国内,都风光一时。堪称“劲旅”。但是一旦和外国侵略者和外国侵略者的支持者作战,两者的差距就相差的十分明显了,在清朝末年,中国取得了两次重大的军事胜利,一次是左宗棠率领以刘锦堂部二万老湘军为主力收复新疆,为祖国收复了160万平方公里的土地,一次是湘军王德榜率领的老湘军二十一营在镇南关配合冯子材取得了大捷,打败法国侵略者。而这两次外战,皆不见淮军的影子,如果有的话,那就是1875年淮军刘铭传部带着几万人在陕西大吃大喝,不肯入甘肃和新疆作战,1884年淮军潘鼎新部面对法国兵惊慌失措,仓皇而逃。为什么两者外战中表现这么大呢?军队战斗力的形成,第一是对将才的选用。在这方面,湘军(至少是高级将领)在道德上和能力上有比较高的要求,这样的将领才能适应战争的特殊需求。曾国藩宣言:奉命以来,日夜悚惕。自度才能浅薄,不足谋事,唯有“不要钱,不怕死”六字时时自矢,以质鬼神,以对君父,即以藉以号召吾乡之豪杰。曾国藩以其慷慨赴死之精神自勉,也以此要求将才。初创湘军时曾国藩曾提出四条:“带兵之人,第一要才堪治民;第二要不怕死;第三要不急急名利;第四要耐受辛苦,大抵有忠义血性,则四者相从以俱至;无忠义血性,则貌似四者。终不可恃。”道义和忠义,始终是湘军选拔将领不放弃的两个要求,而湘军将领主要靠儒家传统道德来教育和约束自己。湘军主要将领几乎全出自儒生,罗泽南、王鑫等都是理学家,彭玉麟是个学者,胡林翼则是进士出身。这些人有种理想 主义,有为理想赴汤蹈火的决心。而淮军将领就不是那么回事了。淮军将领中读书人不多,主要将领中,只有潘鼎新是举人,另外如程学启是太平军的降将,刘铭传是盐贩子出身,张树声、张树珊和周盛波、周盛传兄弟则基本上是地痞一类的人物,靠办团练起家。吴长庆出身行伍,曾做过中下级军官。他们这些人出身比较低微,没有什么道德和理想,重利不重德。在国内战场依靠火力还能掩饰一下,一旦和强悍的外敌作战,其没有忠义血性的本性就出来了。1884年中法战争时,张树声、潘鼎新怕死不肯作战被革去督、抚职;中日甲午战争中,叶志超千里大溃逃,这些人豪无道德和忠义血性可言。而湘军在极端困难的情况下打败外国侵略者和外国侵略者的支持者,靠的就是一股不可动摇的勇气。军队战斗力的形成,第二是对士兵的选用。湘军练兵必须亲自招募,绝不假手他人。而且严定士兵标准,择技艺娴熟,年轻力壮,朴实而有农夫土气者为上,其油头滑面,有市井气者,有衙门气者概不收用。曾国藩一再强调“但求其精,不求其多,但求有济,不求速效”,练一收一人之益,练一月收一月之效”在这样的严格选拔,严格训练,严格管理下,湘军的士兵素质都比较高。而且他们来自一个地方,互相比较了解,也比较团结。为了防止溃兵滑勇把种种恶习带入湘军,曾国藩除开强调募集边僻地区的山民外。他还让带兵官自行回乡募兵,以一地之兵集中于一营,以增加作战中的互助力。而淮军根本就是一个大杂烩,在士兵招募方面兼收并蓄,士兵的来源的繁杂不齐,张树声、刘铭传、周盛波、潘鼎新、吴长庆有的来自流氓集团,有的来自团练,而战斗力好的程学启部就是来自太平天国的投降士兵组成。李鸿章受西洋影响很深,武器装备基本以洋枪为主,打内战的时候,这点比仅仅依靠少量洋枪主要装备还是性能略差的国产抬枪鸟铳的湘军好不少。但是一旦要和敌人肉搏战,淮军战斗意志薄弱的缺点就显露无疑。军队战斗力的形成,最重要的是战斗意志。湘军重德和个人操守,追求儒家保家为国的境界,砥砺品格,信奉实干,以拙诚、坚忍行事。而淮军很多是廉耻之心而惟利是图的小人。李鸿章明知这些人的真实面目,还仍然愿意委以差使,其直接的后果是吏风日下。所以,淮军的风气败坏,李鸿章也有其不可推卸的责任。淮军那些由招收团练或收编降兵而成的士兵,其素质远不如同期的湘军。斗志和士气都不如湘军,从来只靠火力吃饭,其精锐刘铭传部居然在正面作战被捻军打垮。而写《太平天国亲历记》的英国人林利更对淮军不屑一顾,而在西线见到湘军却高叫“他们的勇敢是清军中前所未见的”。战场上丧失战斗意志的一方必被屠杀!湘军拥有勇猛的战斗风格和坚强的战斗意志,在与外国人作战中,意志和精神力量比几件西洋火器有用的多,“吃得苦,霸得蛮,舍得死”的湖湘精神在外国侵略者的战斗中的展现的淋漓尽致。淮军也颇有些悍将,这些人当年镇压天平天国和捻子时都是一把好手,也算是枪林弹雨中打出来的,但是他们面对的是乌合之众,一旦碰到对方精锐的也同样拥有西式火器的正规军,他们就一败涂地了。在甲午战争中,唯一敢和日军肉搏的就是湘军,牛庄战役惨烈战败,也是湘军最后一缕夕阳。在中国军队近代化的道路上,淮军引进西方武器,以西法操练,依靠西方武器的威力。极大的增强了战斗力。如果内战,淮军战斗力可能会超过湘军。但是经过1864年大裁减的湘军为国家民族取得那么辉煌的胜利的时候,淮军却是丢人现眼。这些没有亮剑精神的军队,始终不能作为国家的依靠。
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