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互联网等信息网络传播视听节目管理办法
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（2004年6月15日国家广电总局局务会议通过 2004年7月6日国家广播电影电视总局令第39号发布 自2004年10月11日起施行）
第一章 总 则
&&& 第一条 为规范互联网等信息网络传播视听节目秩序，加强监督管理，促进社会主义精神文明建设，制定本办法。
&&& 第二条 本办法适用于以互联网协议（IP）作为主要技术形态，以计算机、电视机、手机等各类电子设备为接收终端，通过移动通信网、固定通信网、微波通信网、有线电视网、卫星或其他城域网、广域网、局域网等信息网络，从事开办、播放（含点播、转播、直播）、集成、传输、下载视听节目服务等活动。
&&& 本办法所称视听节目（包括影视类音像制品），是指利用摄影机、摄像机、录音机和其它视音频摄制设备拍摄、录制的，由可连续运动的图像或可连续收听的声音组成的视音频节目。
&&& 第三条 国家广播电影电视总局（以下简称广电总局）负责全国互联网等信息网络传播视听节目（以下简称信息网络传播视听节目）的管理工作。
&&& 县级以上地方广播电视行政部门负责本辖区内互联网等信息网络传播视听节目的管理工作。
&&& 第四条 国家对从事信息网络传播视听节目业务实行许可制度。
&&& 第五条 国家鼓励地（市）级以上广播电台、电视台通过国际互联网传播视听节目。
第二章 业务许可
&&& 第六条 从事信息网络传播视听节目业务，应取得《信息网络传播视听节目许可证》。
&&& 《信息网络传播视听节目许可证》由广电总局按照信息网络传播视听节目的业务类别、接收终端、传输网络等项目分类核发。
&&& 业务类别分为播放自办节目、转播节目和提供节目集成运营服务等。
&&& 接收终端分为计算机、电视机、手机及其它各类电子设备。
&&& 传输网络分为移动通信网、固定通信网、微波通信网、有线电视网、卫星或其他城域网、广域网、局域网等。
&&& 第七条 外商独资、中外合资、中外合作机构，不得从事信息网络传播视听节目业务。
&&& 经广电总局批准设立的广播电台、电视台或依法享有互联网新闻发布资格的网站可以申请开办信息网络传播新闻类视听节目业务，其他机构和个人不得开办信息网络传播新闻类视听节目业务。
&&& 经广电总局批准设立的省、自治区、直辖市及省会市、计划单列市级以上广播电台、电视台、广播影视集团（总台），可以申请自行或设立机构从事以电视机作为接收终端的信息网络传播视听节目集成运营服务。其他机构和个人不得开办此类业务。
&&& 第八条 申请《信息网络传播视听节目许可证》，应当具备下列条件：
&&& （一）符合广电总局确定的信息网络传播视听节目的总体规划和布局；
&&& （二）符合国家规定的行业规范和技术标准；
&&& （三）有与业务规模相适应的自有资金、设备、场所及必要的专业人员；
&&& （四）拥有与业务规模相适应并符合国家规定的视听节目资源；
&&& （五）拥有与业务规模相适应的服务信誉、技术能力和网络资源；
&&& （六）有健全的节目内容审查制度、播出管理制度；
&&& （七）有可行的节目监控方案；
&&& （八）其他法律、行政法规规定的条件。
&&& 第九条 申请《信息网络传播视听节目许可证》，须提交以下材料：
&&& （一）申请报告，内容应包括：业务类别（自办节目、转播、集成等）、播出标识（从事信息网络传播视听节目业务的专用标识）、传播方式（频道播出、点播、下载定制、轮播、数据广播等）、传输网络、传播载体、传播范围、接收终端、节目类别、集成内容等；
&&& （二）《信息网络传播视听节目许可证》申请表；
&&& （三）从事信息网络传播视听节目业务的内容规划、技术方案、运营方案、管理制度；
&&& （四）向政府监管部门提供监控信号的监控方案；
&&& （五）人员、设备、场所的证明资料；
&&& （六）申办机构的基本情况及与开展业务有关的证明（网站注册文件、广播电台、电视台许可证、广播电视节目制作经营许可证、从事登载新闻业务许可文件等）；
&&& （七）公司章程、营业执照、验资证明（申请人为企业的）。
&&& 第十条 申请《信息网络传播视听节目许可证》的机构，应向所在地县级以上广播电视行政部门提出申请，并提交符合第九条规定的书面材料，经逐级审核同意后，报广电总局审批。
&&& 中央所属企事业单位，可直接向广电总局提出申请。
&&& 符合条件的，广电总局予以颁发《信息网络传播视听节目许可证》。
&&& 第十一条 负责受理的广播电视行政部门应按照行政许可法规定的期限和权限，履行受理、审核职责。申请人的申请符合法定标准的，有权作出决定的广播电视行政部门应作出准予行政许可的书面决定。依法作出不予行政许可决定的，应当书面通知申请人并说明理由。
&&& 第十二条 《信息网络传播视听节目许可证》有效期为二年。有效期届满，需继续从事信息网络传播视听节目业务的，应于期满六个月前按本办法规定的审批程序办理续办手续。
&&& 第十三条 获得《信息网络传播视听节目许可证》的机构（以下简称持证机构）应当按照《信息网络传播视听节目许可证》载明的开办主体、业务类别、标识、传播方式、传输网络、传播载体、传播范围、接收终端、节目类别和集成内容等事项从事信息网络传播视听节目业务。
&&& 第十四条 持证机构变更注册资本、股东和持股比例及许可证载明的开办主体、业务类别、标识、传播方式、传播载体、传播范围、接收终端、节目类别和集成内容等事项的，应提前六十日报广电总局批准并办理许可证登载事项变更手续。
&&& 持证机构地址、网址、网站名、法定代表人等事项发生变更的，应当在变更后三十日内向广电总局备案并办理许可证登载事项变更手续。
&&& 第十五条 持证机构应当在领取《信息网络传播视听节目许可证》九十日内开通业务。如因特殊理由不能如期开通，应经发证机关同意，否则按终止业务处理。
&&& 第十六条 持有《信息网络传播视听节目许可证》的机构需终止业务的，应提前六十日向原发证机关申报，其《信息网络传播视听节目许可证》由原发证机关予以公告注销。
第三章 业务监管
&&& 第十七条 用于通过信息网络向公众传播的新闻类视听节目，限于境内广播电台、电视台、广播电视台以及经批准的新闻网站制作、播放的节目。
&&& 用于通过信息网络向公众传播的影视剧类视听节目，必须取得《电视剧发行许可证》、《电影公映许可证》。
&&& 第十八条 通过信息网络传播视听节目，应符合《著作权法》的规定。
&&& 第十九条 禁止通过信息网络传播有以下内容的视听节目：
&&& （一）反对宪法确定的基本原则的；
&&& （二）危害国家统一、主权和领土完整的；
&&& （三）泄露国家秘密、危害国家安全或者损害国家荣誉和利益的；
&&& （四）煽动民族仇恨、民族歧视，破坏民族团结，或者侵害民族风俗、习惯的；
&&& （五）宣扬邪教、迷信的；
&&& （六）扰乱社会秩序，破坏社会稳定的；
&&& （七）宣扬淫秽、赌博、暴力或者教唆犯罪的；
&&& （八）侮辱或者诽谤他人，侵害他人合法权益的；
&&& （九）危害社会公德或者民族优秀文化传统的；
&&& （十）有法律、行政法规和国家规定禁止的其他内容的。
&&& 第二十条 持证机构应建立健全节目审查、安全播出的管理制度，实行节目总编负责制，配备节目审查员，对其播放的节目内容进行审查。
&&& 第二十一条 信息网络的经营机构不得向未持有《信息网络传播视听节目许可证》的机构提供与传播视听节目业务有关的服务。
&&& 第二十二条 传播视听节目的名称、内容概要、播出时间、时长、来源等信息，持证机构应当至少保留三十日。
&&& 第二十三条 利用信息网络转播视听节目，只能转播广播电台、电视台播出的广播电视节目，不得转播非法开办的广播电视节目，不得转播境外广播电视节目。
&&& 利用信息网络链接或集成视听节目，只能链接或集成取得《信息网络传播视听节目许可证》机构开办的视听节目，不得链接或集成境外互联网站的视听节目。
&&& 第二十四条 省级以上广播电视行政部门应设立视听节目监控系统、建立公众监督举报制度，加强对信息网络传播视听节目的监督管理。
&&& 持证机构应当为视听节目监控系统提供必要的信号接入条件。
第四章 罚 则
&&& 第二十五条 违反本办法规定，未经批准，擅自从事信息网络传播视听节目业务的，由县级以上广播电视行政部门予以取缔，可以并处一万元以上三万元以下的罚款；构成犯罪的，依法追究刑事责任。
&&& 第二十六条 违反本办法规定，有下列行为之一的，由县级以上广播电视行政部门责令停止违法活动、给予警告、限期整改，可以并处三万元以下的罚款：构成犯罪的，依法追究刑事责任。
&&& （一）未按《信息网络传播视听节目许可证》载明的事项从事信息网络传播视听节目业务的；
&&& （二）未经批准，擅自变更许可证载明事项、持证机构注册资本、股东和持股比例；
&&& （三）违反本办法第十六条、第十八条规定的；
&&& （四）传播本办法第十九条规定禁止传播的视听节目的；
&&& （五）向未持有《信息网络传播视听节目许可证》的机构提供与传播视听节目业务有关服务的；
&&& （六）未按规定保留视听节目播放记录的；
&&& （七）利用信息网络转播境外广播电视节目，转播非法开办的广播电视节目的；
&&& （八）非法链接、集成境外广播电视节目以及非法链接、集成境外网站传播的视听节目的。
&&& 第二十七条 违反本办法规定，开办机构的法定代表人、节目总编或节目审查员未履行应尽职责，出现三次以上违规内容的，省级以上广播电视行政部门对开办机构予以警告，可以并处一千元以下罚款。
第五章 附 则
&&& 第二十八条 本办法实施前已领取《网上传播视听节目许可证》的机构，应在本办法实施之日起六个月内按照本办法规定申换许可证。
&&& 第二十九条 本办法自2004年10月11日起施行。广电总局《互联网等信息网络传播视听节目管理办法》（广电总局令第15号）同时废止。
(责任编辑：李玉东)
主办：吉林省工业和信息化厅
承办：吉林省工业和信息化厅信息中心
技术支持：长春吉大正元信息技术股份有限公司 技术支持当前位置: >
诸城：办理新农保为何要缴50元“手续费”
来源:潍坊电视台
新型农村社会养老保险简称新农保，年满60周岁、未享受城镇职工基本养老保险待遇的农村有户籍的老年人，可以按月领取养老金。这是国家出台的政策，办理时本不需要缴纳费用，可是在诸城市林家村镇万家庄社区南王家夼村年满60岁的村民在办理这个业务时，却缴纳了50元的手续费，这到底是为什么呢？记者来到了诸城市林家村镇万家庄社区南王家夼村了解情况。记者：您今年多大了？村民：64。&记者：办这个保险了没？&村民：办了，要了50块钱。只要是办这个，就必须交50元。&记者：你从什么时候开始办的？村民： 我是61岁开始办的 。记者：你有没有去了解了解办这个新农保，具体有个什么流程？村民： 我也没问这个事 。记者：就是村里下来收你就交？村民：&嗯， 当时他收说是也不光是我自己，都是一个人50块钱。
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【案例报告】情势变更原则在专利行政诉讼案件中也可以适用
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情势变更原则在专利行政诉讼案件中也可以适用
——陕西建工第八建设集团有限公司因不服西安市知识产权局作出的侵害专利权处理决定行政行为纠纷案
【判决要点】
情势变更原则作为一般的法律原则，虽非行政诉讼法规定的原则之一，但在侵害专利权行政诉讼案件中，专利权作为一种私权，具有民事权利的法律属性，专利行政管理机关处理的是当事人之间因民事权益产生的纠纷，案件本身具有特殊性。如果人民法院仅仅将行政机关的具体行政行为合法性作为审理侵害专利权行政案件的审查标准，忽视已经发生变化的客观事实，显然对当事人不公平，也会影响民事案件的审理，因此侵害专利权行政诉讼案件中对情势变更原则也应予以适用。
原告：陕西建工第八建设集团有限公司
被告：西安市知识产权局
第三人：黄素清
来源：陕西省中级人民法院(2016)陕01民初59号行政判决书
【案情简介】
2013年3月4日，黄素清向国家知识产权局申请了名为“架板”的实用新型专利，日，国家知识产权局授予黄素清“架板”的实用新型专利权，专利号为ZL.2。日黄素清以陕建八公司未经许可，使用其专利产品构成侵权为由，向西安市知识产权局请求处理要求陕建八公司立即停止侵权行为，公开赔礼道歉，消除影响并赔偿经济损失含合理支出共计人民币20万元。
2015年5月25日西安市知识产权局作出处理决定：1.被请求人陕建八公司立即停止使用侵犯请求人黄素清ZL.2号“架板”实用新型专利权的产品；2.已经使用及尚未使用的侵权产品不得以任何形式投放市场，并予以封存销毁；3.不支持请求人其他请求事项。决定作出后，陕建八公司不服，提起行政诉讼。期间，国家知识产权局专利复审委员会宣告.2号专利权全部无效，该决定已生效。
西安市中级人民法院审理后判决：撤销西安市知识产权局西知法处字[2015]9号专利侵权纠纷案件处理决定。
【判决观察】
一审法院认为，本案争议的焦点问题是：
一、关于陕建八公司起诉时是否已超过法定起诉期间的问题。
根据本院查明的事实，在专利法规定的提起行政诉讼的期限15日内，陕建八公司因为不服西安知产局作出的[2015]9号《专利侵权纠纷案件处理决定书》，提起了行政诉讼。西安知产局主张陕建八公司未在法定期限内提起行政诉讼而丧失诉权，本院不予支持。
二、关于西安知产局的行政处理决定是否违反法定程序的问题
本院认为，西安知产局作为西安市管理专利工作的部门，有权处理专利侵权纠纷。[2015]9号《专利侵权纠纷案件处理决定书》虽然书写中遗漏了陕建八公司的代理人李弘，但李弘参加了行政处理阶段的口审，李弘口审中的意见，在处理决定书中也有表述，故并未损害陕建八公司的合法权益。陕建八公司是否系善意使用者及提供产品来源是否合法，按照当时的法律规定，并非行政处理阶段案件的争议焦点。至于陕建八公司主张西安知产局拒绝第三人参与庭审，违反法定程序的理由，因无法律依据，本院不予采信。综上，陕建八公司提出的西安知产局行政处理程序违法的主张，因事实和法律依据不足，本院不予支持。
三、关于西安知产局行政处理决定认定证据是否确凿的问题
根据本院查明的事实，日，西安知产局进行了现场勘验并提取了证据，陕建八公司对被控侵权产品落入ZL.2“架板”实用新型专利权利要求1的保护范围，并无异议。因此，西安知产局作出的行政处理决定认定证据确凿。
四、关于行政处理决定适用法律、法规是否正确的问题
西安知产局根据《中华人民共和国专利法》第五十九条第一款“发明或者实用新型专利权的保护范围以其权利要求的内容为准，说明书及附图可以用于解释权利要求的内容”、第六十条“未经专利权人许可，实施其专利，即侵犯其专利权，引起纠纷的，由当事人协商解决；不愿协商或者协商不成的，专利权人或者利害关系人可以向人民法院起诉，也可以请求管理专利工作的部门处理。管理专利工作的部门处理时，认定侵权行为成立的，可以责令侵权人立即停止侵权行为，当事人不服的，可以自收到处理通知之日起十五日内依照《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》向人民法院起诉”，适用《最高人民法院关于审理侵犯专利权纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的解释》第七条“人民法院判定被诉侵权技术方案是否落入专利权的保护范围，应当审查权利人主张的权利要求所记载的全部技术特征。被诉侵权技术方案包含与权利要求记载的全部技术特征相同或者等同的技术特征的，人民法院应当认定其落入专利权的保护范围；被诉侵权技术方案的技术特征与权利要求记载的全部技术特征相比，缺少权利要求记载的一个以上的技术特征，或者有一个以上技术特征不相同也不等同的，人民法院应当认定其没有落入专利权的保护范围”对本案处理适用法律并无不当。
五、关于本案是否适用情势变更原则的问题
情势变更原则作为一般的法律原则，虽非行政诉讼法规定的原则之一，但在专利侵权行政诉讼中，专利权作为一种私权，具有民事权利的法律属性，专利行政管理机关处理的是当事人之间因民事权益产生的纠纷，案件本身具有特殊性。如果人民法院仅仅将行政机关的具体行政行为合法性作为审理专利侵权行政案件的审查标准，忽视已经发生变化的客观事实，显然对当事人不公平，也会影响民事案件的审理，更不符合专利法保护专利权人利益的立法宗旨，因此专利侵权案件行政诉讼中对情势变更原则也应予以适用。
在行政诉讼中适用情势变更原则应当具备的要件是：有发生情势变更的事实；情势变更须发生在被诉行政行为作出之后终审判决之前；不适用情势变更原则显失公平；情势变更的发生不可归责于当事人且当事人无过错。根据本院查明的事实，日西安知产局作出西知法处字[2015]9号专利侵权纠纷案件处理决定后，国家知识产权局专利复审委员会于日作出第28432号无效宣告请求审查决定书决定：宣告.2号实用新型的专利权全部无效。由此事实证明，西安知产局作出专利侵权纠纷案件处理决定后，黄素清请求保护的争讼之实用新型专利的专利权已经被全部宣告无效，西安知产局作出专利侵权纠纷案件处理决定的事实依据已经发生变化，判决维持西安知产局的上述决定显然对被控侵权人不公平，且情势变更的发生不可归责于当事人。
虽然对于具体行政行为合法性的审查原则上应以作出行政行为时所依据的事实为准，但在诉讼过程中出现了请求保护的专利权利要求被宣告无效的新情况，仅考虑被诉具体行政行为时的事实情况，对已经可能影响诉争专利无效的事实不予考虑，显然与以事实为依据的法律原则相悖。因此人民法院应尊重事实，避免因机械性适用法律导致裁判错误。基于专利侵权行政诉讼案件既要对具体行政行为合法性进行审查，也要对当事人合法诉求予以实质性解决，人民法院对已经作出的行政处理决定，应根据相应的事实依据已经发生变化的情形进行审查，并依法作出裁决。
综上，西安知产局在对本案作出处理决定时，虽未有不妥，但本院根据情势变更原则，依据新事实判决如下：
撤销西安市知识产权局于日作出的西知法处字[2015]9号专利侵权纠纷案件处理决定。
1、本报告基于研究价值和参考意义而选择编辑了部分案例，但这并不代表本报告赞同法院的观点及其判决结果；
2、本报告在对判决书或新闻资讯进行选摘编辑时，有可能存在错讹或误解，欢迎与我们联系；
3、本报告将定期在电子版《知识产权案例资讯》中选登，请点击阅读原文订阅案例资讯。
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&&& 2commons
&&& 3&& ( innovation commons)
&&& 91984( end-to-end argument)
121990end-to-end
151956AT&T
171984AT&TISP
19MP3E-MAILTCP/IPTCP/IP
20LINUXGUN/LINUXAPACHE
& 25AOLCOMPUSERVEHOTMAIL
& 26ICQAOL400
& 27<SPAN lang=EN-
& 29OPENDEMOCRACY.ORG
& 35Peer-to-peer
& 38202090
& 41200084%5
& 425<SPAN lang=EN-MP3NAPSTER
& 43NAPSTER
& 461998DMCAISP
& 49DMCADimitry Sklyarov AdobeSklyarov20016SklyarovSklyarov25
& 50ISPISPISP20018DMCAISPISP
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The Internet Under Siege
/issue_novdec_2001/lessig.html
Foreign Policy Magazine, Nov./Dec.2001
Who owns the Internet? Until recently, nobody. That's because, although the Internet was "Made in the U.S.A.," its unique design transformed it into a resource for innovation that anyone in the world could use. Today, however, courts and corporations are attempting to wall off portions of cyberspace. In so doing, they are destroying the Internet's potential to foster democracy and economic growth worldwide.
By Lawrence Lessig
The Internet revolution has ended just as surprisingly as it began. None expected the explosion of creativity that
few expected that explosion to collapse as quickly and profoundly as it has. The phenomenon has the feel of a shooting star, flaring unannounced across the night sky, then disappearing just as unexpectedly. Under the guise of protecting private property, a series of new laws and regulations are dismantling the very architecture that made the
Internet a framework for global innovation.
Neither the appearance nor disappearance of this revolution is difficult to understand. The difficulty is in accepting the lessons of the Internet's evolution. The Internet was born in the United States, but its success grew out of notions that seem far from the modern American ideals of property and the market. Americans are captivated by the idea, as explained by Yale Law School professor Carol Rose, that the world is best managed "when divided among private owners" and when the market perfectly regulates those divided resources. But the Internet took off precisely because core resources were not "divided among private owners." Instead, the core resources of the Internet were left in a "commons." It was this commons that engendered the extraordinary innovation that the Internet has seen. It is the enclosure of this commons that will bring about the Internet's demise.
This commons was built into the very architecture of the original network. Its design secured a right of decentralized innovation. It was this "innovation commons" that produced the diversity of creativity that the network has seen within the United States and, even more dramatically, abroad. Many of the Internet innovations we now take for granted (not the least of which is the World Wide Web) were the creations of "outsiders"―foreign inventors who freely roamed the commons. Policymakers need to understand the importance of this architectural design to the innovation and creativity of the original network. The potential of the Internet has just begun to be realized, especially in the developing world, where many "real space" alternatives for commerce and innovation are neither free nor open.
Yet old ways of thinking are reasserting themselves within the United States to modify this design.
Changes to the Internet's original core will in turn threaten the network's potential everywhere―staunching the opportunity for innovation and creativity. Thus, at the moment this transformation could have a meaningful effect, a counterrevolution is succeeding in undermining the potential of this network.&
The motivation for this counterrevolution is as old as revolutions themselves. As Niccolò Machiavelli described long before the Internet, "Innovation makes enemies of all those who prospered under the old regime, and only lukewarm support is forthcoming from those who would prosper under the new." And so it is today with us. Those who prospered under the old regime are threatened by the Internet. Those who would prosper under the new regime have not risen to defen whether they will is still a question. So far, it appears they will not.
The Neutral Zone
A "commons" is a resource to which everyone within a relevant community has equal access. It is a resource that is not, in an important sense, "controlled." Private or state-owned property is a only as the owner specifies may that property be used. But a commons is not subject to this sort of control. Neutral or equal restrictions may apply to it (an entrance fee to a park, for example) but not the restrictions of an owner. A commons, in this sense, leaves its resources "free."
Commons are features of all cultures. They have been especially important to cultures outside the United States―from communal tenure systems in Switzerland and Japan to irrigation communities within the Philippines. But within American intellectual culture, commons are treated as imperfect resources. They are the object of "tragedy," as ecologist Garrett Hardin famously described. Wherever a commons exists, the aim is to enclose it. In the American psyche, commons are unnecessary vestiges from times past and best removed, if possible.
For most resources, for most of the time, the bias against commons makes good sense. When resources are left in common, individuals may be driven to overconsume, and therefore deplete, them. But for some resources, the bias against commons is blinding. Some resources are not subject to the "tragedy of the commons" because some resources cannot be "depleted." (No matter how much we use Einstein's theories of relativity or copy Robert Frost's poem "New Hampshire," those resources will survive.) For these resources, the challenge is to induce provision, not to avoid depletion. The problems of provision are very different from the problems of depletion―confusing the two only leads to misguided policies.
This confusion is particularly acute when considering the Internet. At the core of the Internet is a design (chosen without a clear sense of its consequences) that was new among large-scale computer and communications networks. Named the "end-to-end argument" by network theorists Jerome Saltzer, David Clark, and David Reed in 1984, this design influences where "intelligence" in the network is placed. Traditional computer-communications systems located intelligence, and hence control, within the network itself. Networks were "smart"; they were designed by people who believed they knew exactly what the network would be used for.
But the Internet was born at a time when a different philosophy was taking shape within computer science. This philosophy ranked humility above omniscience and anticipated that network designers would have no clear idea about all the ways the network could be used. It therefore counseled a design that built little into the network itself, leaving the network free to develop as the ends (the applications) wanted.
The motivation for this new design was flexibility. The consequence was innovation. Because innovators needed no permission from the network owner before different applications or content got served across the network, innovators were freer to develop new modes of connection. Technically, the network achieved this design simply by focusing on the delivery of packets of data, oblivious to either the contents of the packets or their owners. Nor does the network concern itself that all the packets make their way to the other side. The network is "best efforts"; anything more is provided by the applications at both ends. Like an efficient post office (imagine!), the system simply forwards the data along.
Since the network was not optimized for any single application or service, the Internet remained open to new innovation. The World Wide Web is perhaps the best example. The Web was the creation of computer scientist Tim Berners-Lee at the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) laboratory in Geneva in late 1990. Berners-Lee wanted to enable users on a
network to have easy access to documents located elsewhere on the network. He therefore developed a set of protocols to enable hypertext links among documents located across the network. Because of end-to-end, these protocols could be layered on top of the initial protocols of the Internet. This meant the Internet could grow to embrace the Web. Had the network compromised its commitment to end-to-end―had its design been optimized to favor telephony, for example, as many in the 1980s wanted―then the Web would not have been possible.
This end-to-end design is the "core" of the Internet. If we can think of the network as built in layers, then the end-to-end design was created by a set of protocols implemented at the middle layer―what we might call the logical, or code layer, of the Internet. Below the code layer is a physical layer (computers and the wires that link them). Above the code layer is a content layer (material that gets served across the network). Not all these layers were organized as commons. The computers at the physical layer are private property, not "free" in the sense of a commons. Much of the content served across the network is protected by copyright. It, too, is not "free."
At the code layer, however, the Internet is a commons. By design, no one controls the resources for innovation that get served across this layer. Individuals control the physical layer, deciding whether a machine or network gets connected to the Internet. But once connected, at least under the Internet's original design, the innovation resources for the network remained free.
No other large scale network left the code layer free in this way. For most of the history of telephone monopolies worldwide, permission to innovate on the telephone platform was vigorously controlled. In the United States in 1956, AT&T successfully persuaded the U.S. Federal Communications Commission to block the use of a plastic cup on a telephone receiver, designed to block noise from the telephone microphone, on the theory that AT&T alone had the right to innovation on the telephone network.
The Internet might have remained an obscure tool of government-backed researchers if the telephone company had maintained this control. The Internet would never have taken off if ordinary individuals had been unable to connect to the network by way of Internet service providers (ISPs) through already existing telephone lines. Yet this right to connect was not preordained. It is here that an accident in regulatory history played an important role. Just at the moment the Internet was emerging, the telephone monopoly was being moved to a different regulatory paradigm. Previously, the telephone monopoly was essentially free to control its wires as it wished. Beginning in the late 1960s, and then more vigorously throughout the 1980s, the government began to require that the telephone industry behave neutrally―first by insisting that telephone companies permit customer premises equipment (such as modems) to be connected to the network, and then by requiring that telephone companies allow others to have access to their wires.
This kind of regulation was rare among telecommunications monopolies worldwide. In Europe and throughout the world, telecommunications monopolies were permitted to control the uses of their networks. No requirement of access operated to enable competition. Thus no system of competition grew up around these other monopolies. But when the United States broke up AT&T in 1984, the resulting companies no longer had the freedom to discriminate against other uses of their lines. And when ISPs sought access to the local Bell lines to enable customers to connect to the Internet, the local Bells were required to grant access equally. This enabled a vigorous competition in Internet access, and this competition meant that the network could not behave strategically against this new technology. In effect, through a competitive market, an end-to-end design was created at the physical layer of the telephone network, which meant that an end-to-end design could be layered on top of that.
This innovation commons was thus layered onto a physical infrastructure that, through regulation, had mportant commons-like features. Common-carrier regulation of the telephone system assured that the system could not discriminate against an emerging competitor, the Internet. And the Internet itself was created, through its end-to-end design, to assure that no particular application or use could discriminate against any other innovations. Neutrality existed at the physical and code layer of the Internet.
An important neutrality also existed at the content layer of the Internet. This layer includes all the
content streamed across the network―Web pages, MP3s, e-mail, streaming video―as well as application programs that run on, or feed, the network. These programs are distinct from the protocols at the code layer, collectively referred to as TCP/IP (including the protocols of the World Wide Web). TCP/IP is dedicated to the public domain.
But the code above these protocols is not in the public domain. It is, instead, of two sorts: proprietary and nonproprietary. The proprietary includes the familiar Microsoft operating systems and Web servers, as well as programs from other software companies. The nonproprietary includes open source and free software, especially the Linux (or GNU/Linux) operating system, the Apache server, as well as a host of other plumbing-oriented code that makes the Net run.
Nonproprietary code creates a commons at the content layer. The commons here is not just the resource that a particular program might provide―for example, the functionality of an operating system or Web server. The commons also includes the source code of software that can be drawn upon and modified by others. Open source and free software ("open code" for short) must be distributed with the source code. The source code must be free for others to take and modify. This
commons at the content layer means that others can take and build upon open source and free software. It also means that open code can't be captured and tilted against any particular competitor. Open code can always be modified by subsequent adopters. It, therefore, is licensed to remain neutral among subsequent uses. There is no "owner" of an open code project.
In this way, and again, parallel to the end-to-end principle at the code layer, open code decentralizes innovation. It keeps a platform neutral. This neutrality in turn inspires innovators to build for that platform because they need not fear the platform will turn against them. Open code builds a commons for innovation at the content layer. Like the commons at the code layer, open code preserves the opportunity for innovation and protects innovation against the strategic behavior of competitors. Free resources induce innovation.
An Engine of Innovation
The original Internet, as it was extended to society generally, mixed controlled and free resources at each layer of the network. At the core code layer, the network was free. The end-to-end design assured that no network owner could exercise control over the network. At the physical layer, the resources were essentially controlled, but even here, important aspects were free. One had the right to connect a machine to the network or not, but telephone companies didn't have the right to discriminate against this particular use of their network. And finally, at the content layer, many of the resources served across the Internet were controlled. But a crucial range of software building essential services on the Internet remained free. Whether through an open source or free software license, these resources could not be controlled.
This balance of control and freedom produced an unprecedented explosion in innovation. The power, and hence the right, to innovate was essentially decentralized. The Internet might have been an American invention, but creators from around the world could build upon this network platform. Significantly, some of the most important innovations for the Internet came from these "outsiders."
As noted, the most important technology for accessing and browsing the Internet (the World Wide Web) was not invented by companies specializing in network access. It wasn't America Online (AOL) or Compuserve. The Web was developed by a researcher in a Swiss laboratory who first saw its potential and then fought to bring it to fruition. Likewise, it wasn't existing e-mail providers who came up with the idea of Web-based e-mail. That was co-created by an immigrant to the United States from India, Sabeer Bhatia, and it gave birth to one of the fastest growing communities in history―Hotmail.
And it wasn't traditional network providers or telephone companies that invented the applications
that enabled online chatting to take off. The original community-based chatting service (ICQ) was the invention of an Israeli, far from the trenches of network design. His service could explode (and then be purchased by AOL for $400 million) only because the network was left open for this type of innovation.
Similarly, the revolution in bookselling initiated
(through the use of technologies that "match preferences" of customers) was invented far from the traditional organs of publishers. By gathering a broad range of data about purchases by customers, Amazon―drawing upon technology first developed at MIT and the University of Minnesota to filter Usenet news―can predict what a customer is likely to want. These recommendations drive sales, but without the high cost of advertising or promotion. Consequently, booksellers such as Amazon can outcompete traditional marketers of books, which may account for the rapid expansion of Amazon into Asia and Europe.
These innovations are at the level of Internet services. Far more profound have been innovations at
the level of content. The Internet has not only inspired invention, it has also inspired publication
in a way that would never have been produced by the world of existing publishers. The creation of online archives of lyrics and chord sequences and of collaborative databases collecting information about compact discs and movies demonstrates the kind of creativity that was possible because the right to create was not controlled.
Again, the innovations have not been limited to the United States. OpenDemocracy.org, for example, is a London-based, Web-centered forum for debate and exchange about democracy and governance throughout the world. Such a forum is possible only because no coordination among international actors is needed. And it thrives because it can engender debate at a low cost.
This history should be a lesson. Every significant innovation on the Internet has emerged outside of traditional providers. The new grows away from the old. This trend teaches the value of leaving the platform open for innovation. Unfortunately, that platform is now under siege. Every technological disruption creates winners and losers. The losers have an interest in avoiding that disruption if they can. This was the lesson Machiavelli taught, and it is the experience with every important technological change over time. It is also what we are now seeing with the Internet. The innovation commons of the Internet threatens important and powerful pre-Internet interests. During the past five years, those interests have mobilized to launch a counterrevolution that is now having a global impact.
This movement is fueled by pressure at both the physical and content layers of the network. These
changes, in turn, put pressure on the freedom of the code layer. These changes will have an effect on the opportunity for growth and innovation that the Internet presents. Policymakers keen to protect that growth should be skeptical of changes that will threaten it. Broad-based innovation may threaten the profits of some existing interests, but the social gains from this unpredictable growth will far outstrip the private losses, especially in nations just beginning to connect.
Fencing Off& the Commons
The Internet took off on telephone lines. Narrowband service across acoustic modems enabled millions of computers to connect through thousands of ISPs. Local telephone service providers had to provide ISPs with a they were not permitted to discriminate against Internet service. Thus the physical platform on which the Internet was born was regulated to remain neutral. This regulation had an important effect. A nascent industry could be born on the telephone wires, regardless of the desires of telephone companies.
But as the Internet moves from narrowband to broadband, the regulatory environment is changing. The dominant broadband technology in the United States is currently cable. Cable lives under a different regulatory regime. Cable providers in general have no obligation to grant access to their facilities. And cable has asserted the right to discriminate in the Internet service it provides.
Consequently, cable has begun to push for a different set of principles at the code layer of the network. Cable companies have deployed technologies to enable them to engage in a form of discrimination in the service they provide. Cisco, for example, developed "policy-based routers" that enable cable companies to choose which content flows quickly and which flows slowly. With these, and other technologies, cable companies will be in a position to exercise power over the content and applications that operate on their networks.
This control has already begun in the United States. ISPs running cable services have exercised their power to ban certain kinds of applications (specifically, those that enable peer-to-peer service). They have blocked particular content (advertising from competitors, for example) when that content was not consistent with their business model. The model for these providers is the model of cable television generally―controlling access and content to the cable providers' end.
The environment of innovation on the original network will change according to the extent that cable becomes the primary mode of access to the Internet. Rather than a network that vests intelligence in the ends, the cable-dominated network will vest an increasing degree of intelligence within the network itself. And to the extent it does this, the network will increase the opportunity for strategic behavior in favor of some technologies and against others. An essential feature of neutrality at the code layer will have been compromised, reducing the opportunity for innovation worldwide.
Far more dramatic, however, has been the pressure from the content layer on the code layer. This pressure has come in two forms. First, and most directly related to the content described above, there has been an explosion of patent regulation in the context of software. Second, copyright holders have exercised increasing control over new technologies for distribution.
The changes in patent regulation are more difficult to explain, though the consequence is not hard to track. Two decades ago, the U.S. Patent Office began granting patents for software-like inventions. In the late 1990s, the court overseeing these patents finally approved the practice and approved their extension to "business methods." The European Union (EU), meanwhile, initially adopted a more skeptical attitude toward software patents. But pressure from the United States will eventually bring the EU into alignment with American policy.
In principle, these patents are designed to spur innovation. But with sequential and complementary
innovation, little evidence exists that suggests such patents will do any good, and there is increasing evidence that they will do harm. Like any regulation, patents tax the innovative process generally. As with any tax, some firms―large rather than small, U.S. rather than foreign―are better able to bear that tax than others. Open code projects, in particular, are threatened by this trend, as they are least able to negotiate appropriate patent licenses.
The most dramatic restrictions on innovation, however, have come at the hands of copyright holders. Copyright is designed to ensure that artists control their "writings" for a limited time. The aim is to secure to copyright holders a sufficient interest to produce new work. But copyright laws were crafted in an era long before the Internet. And their effect on the Internet has been to transfer control over innovation in distribution from many innovators to a concentrated few.
The clearest example of this effect is online music. Before the Internet, the production and distribution of music had become extraordinarily concentrated. In 2000, for example, five companies controlled 84 percent of music distribution in the world. The reasons for this concentration are many―including the high costs of promotion―but the effect of concentration on artist development is profound. Very few artists make any money from their work, and the few that do are able to do so because of mass marketing from record labels. The Internet had the potential to change this reality. Both because the costs of distribution were so low, and because the
network also had the potential to significantly lower the costs of promotion, the cost of music could fall, and revenues to artists could rise.
Five years ago, this market took off. A large number of online music providers began competing for new ways to distribute music. Some distributed MP3s for money (). Some built technology for giving owners of music easier access to their music (). And some made it much easier for ordinary users to "share" their music with other users (Napster). But as quickly
as these companies took off, lawyers representing old media succeeded in shutting them down. These lawyers argued that copyright law gave the holders (some say hoarders) of these copyrights the exclusive right to control how they get used. American courts agreed.
To keep this dispute in context, we should think about the last example of a technological change that facilitated a much different model for distributing content: cable TV, which has been accurately hailed as the first great Napster. Owners of cable television systems essentially set up antenna and "stole" over-the-air broadcasts and then sold that "stolen property" to their customers. But when U.S. courts were asked to stop this "theft," they refused. Twice the U.S. Supreme Court held that this use of someone else's copyrighted material was not inconsistent with copyright law.
When the U.S. Congress finally got around to changing the law, it struck an importantly illustrative balance. Congress granted copyright owners the right to compensation from the use of their material on cable broadcasts, but cable companies were given the right to broadcast the copyrighted material. The reason for this balance is not hard to see. Copyright owners certainly are entitled to compensation for their work. But the right to compensation shouldn't translate into the power to control innovation. Rather than giving copyright holders the right to veto a particular new use of their work (in this case, because it would compete with over-the-air broadcasting), Congress assured copyright owners would get paid without having the power to control―compensation without control.
The same deal could have been struck by Congress in the context of online music. But this time, the courts did not hesitate to extend control to the copyright holders. So the concentrated holders of these copyrights were able to stop the deployment of competing distributors. And Congress was not motivated to respond by granting an equivalent compulsory right. The aim of the recording company's strategy was plain enough: shut down these new and competing models of distribution and replace them with a model for distributing music online more consistent with the traditional model.
This trend has been supported by the actions of Congress. In 1998, Congress passed the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), which (in)famously banned technologies designed to circumvent copyright protection technologies and also created strong incentives for ISPs to remove from their sites any material claimed to be a violation of copyright.
On the surface both changes seem sensible enough. Copyright protection technologies are analogous to locks. What right does anyone have to pick a lock? And ISPs are in the best position to assure that copyright violations don't occur on their Web sites. Why not create incentives for them to remove infringing copyrighted material?
But intuitions here mislead. A copyright protection technology is just code that controls access to
copyrighted material. But that code can restrict access more effectively (and certainly less subtly)
than copyright law does. Often the desire to crack protection systems is nothing more than a desire to exercise what is sometimes called a fair-use right over the copyrighted material. Yet the DMCA bans that technology, regardless of its ultimate effect.
More troubling, however, is that the DMCA effectively bans this technology on a worldwide basis. Russian programmer Dimitry Sklyarov, for example, wrote code to crack Adobe's eBook technology in order to enable users to move eBooks from one machine to another and to give blind consumers the ability to "read" out loud the books they purchased. The code Sklyarov wrote was legal where it was written, but when it was sold by his company in the United States, it became illegal. When he came to the United States in July 2001 to talk about that code, the FBI arrested him. Today Sklyarov faces a sentence of 25 years for writing code that could be used for fair-use purposes, as well as to violate copyright laws.
Similar trouble has arisen with the provision that gives ISPs the incentive to take down infringing
copyrighted material. When an ISP is notified that material on its site violates copyright, it can avoid liability if it removes the material. As it doesn't have any incentive to expose itself to liability, the ordinary result of such notification is for the ISP to remove the material. Increasingly, companies trying to protect themselves from criticism have used this provision to silence critics. In August 2001, for example, a British pharmaceutical company invoked the DMCA in order to force an ISP to shut down an animal rights site that criticized the British company. Said the ISP, "It's very clear [the British company] just wants to shut them up," but ISPs have no incentive to
resist the claims.&
In all these cases, there is a common pattern. In the push to give copyright owners control over their content, copyright holders also receive the ability to protect themselves against innovations that might threaten existing business models. The law becomes a tool to assure that new innovations don't displace old ones―when instead, the aim of copyright and patent law should be, as the U.S. Constitution requires, to "promote the progress of science and useful arts."
These regulations will not only affect Americans. The expanding jurisdiction that American courts claim, combined with the push by the World Intellectual Property Organization to enact similar legislation elsewhere, means that the impact of this sort of control will be felt worldwide. There is no "local" when it comes to corruption of the Internet's basic principles. As these changes weaken the open source and free software movements, countries with the most to gain from a free and open platform lose. Those affected will include nations in the developing world and nations that do not want to cede control to a single private corporation. And as content becomes more controlled, nations that could otherwise benefit from vigorous competition in the delivery and production of content will also lose. An explosion of innovation to deliver MP3s would directly translate into innovation to deliver telephone calls and video content. Lowering the cost of this medium would dramatically benefit nations that still suffer from weak technical infrastructures.
Policymakers around the world must recognize that the interests most strongly protected by the Internet counterrevolution are not their own. They should be skeptical of legal mechanisms that enable those most threatened by the innovation commons to resist it. The Internet promised the world―particularly the weakest in the world―the fastest and most dramatic change to existing barriers to growth. That promise depends on the network remaining open to innovation. That openness depends upon policy that better understands the Internet's past.
Lawrence Lessig is professor of law at Stanford University. He is author of The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in the Connected World (New York: Random House, 2001) and Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books, 1999).
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互联网等信息网络传播视听节目管理办法
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（2004年6月15日国家广电总局局务会议通过 2004年7月6日国家广播电影电视总局令第39号发布 自2004年10月11日起施行）
第一章 总 则
&&& 第一条 为规范互联网等信息网络传播视听节目秩序，加强监督管理，促进社会主义精神文明建设，制定本办法。
&&& 第二条 本办法适用于以互联网协议（IP）作为主要技术形态，以计算机、电视机、手机等各类电子设备为接收终端，通过移动通信网、固定通信网、微波通信网、有线电视网、卫星或其他城域网、广域网、局域网等信息网络，从事开办、播放（含点播、转播、直播）、集成、传输、下载视听节目服务等活动。
&&& 本办法所称视听节目（包括影视类音像制品），是指利用摄影机、摄像机、录音机和其它视音频摄制设备拍摄、录制的，由可连续运动的图像或可连续收听的声音组成的视音频节目。
&&& 第三条 国家广播电影电视总局（以下简称广电总局）负责全国互联网等信息网络传播视听节目（以下简称信息网络传播视听节目）的管理工作。
&&& 县级以上地方广播电视行政部门负责本辖区内互联网等信息网络传播视听节目的管理工作。
&&& 第四条 国家对从事信息网络传播视听节目业务实行许可制度。
&&& 第五条 国家鼓励地（市）级以上广播电台、电视台通过国际互联网传播视听节目。
第二章 业务许可
&&& 第六条 从事信息网络传播视听节目业务，应取得《信息网络传播视听节目许可证》。
&&& 《信息网络传播视听节目许可证》由广电总局按照信息网络传播视听节目的业务类别、接收终端、传输网络等项目分类核发。
&&& 业务类别分为播放自办节目、转播节目和提供节目集成运营服务等。
&&& 接收终端分为计算机、电视机、手机及其它各类电子设备。
&&& 传输网络分为移动通信网、固定通信网、微波通信网、有线电视网、卫星或其他城域网、广域网、局域网等。
&&& 第七条 外商独资、中外合资、中外合作机构，不得从事信息网络传播视听节目业务。
&&& 经广电总局批准设立的广播电台、电视台或依法享有互联网新闻发布资格的网站可以申请开办信息网络传播新闻类视听节目业务，其他机构和个人不得开办信息网络传播新闻类视听节目业务。
&&& 经广电总局批准设立的省、自治区、直辖市及省会市、计划单列市级以上广播电台、电视台、广播影视集团（总台），可以申请自行或设立机构从事以电视机作为接收终端的信息网络传播视听节目集成运营服务。其他机构和个人不得开办此类业务。
&&& 第八条 申请《信息网络传播视听节目许可证》，应当具备下列条件：
&&& （一）符合广电总局确定的信息网络传播视听节目的总体规划和布局；
&&& （二）符合国家规定的行业规范和技术标准；
&&& （三）有与业务规模相适应的自有资金、设备、场所及必要的专业人员；
&&& （四）拥有与业务规模相适应并符合国家规定的视听节目资源；
&&& （五）拥有与业务规模相适应的服务信誉、技术能力和网络资源；
&&& （六）有健全的节目内容审查制度、播出管理制度；
&&& （七）有可行的节目监控方案；
&&& （八）其他法律、行政法规规定的条件。
&&& 第九条 申请《信息网络传播视听节目许可证》，须提交以下材料：
&&& （一）申请报告，内容应包括：业务类别（自办节目、转播、集成等）、播出标识（从事信息网络传播视听节目业务的专用标识）、传播方式（频道播出、点播、下载定制、轮播、数据广播等）、传输网络、传播载体、传播范围、接收终端、节目类别、集成内容等；
&&& （二）《信息网络传播视听节目许可证》申请表；
&&& （三）从事信息网络传播视听节目业务的内容规划、技术方案、运营方案、管理制度；
&&& （四）向政府监管部门提供监控信号的监控方案；
&&& （五）人员、设备、场所的证明资料；
&&& （六）申办机构的基本情况及与开展业务有关的证明（网站注册文件、广播电台、电视台许可证、广播电视节目制作经营许可证、从事登载新闻业务许可文件等）；
&&& （七）公司章程、营业执照、验资证明（申请人为企业的）。
&&& 第十条 申请《信息网络传播视听节目许可证》的机构，应向所在地县级以上广播电视行政部门提出申请，并提交符合第九条规定的书面材料，经逐级审核同意后，报广电总局审批。
&&& 中央所属企事业单位，可直接向广电总局提出申请。
&&& 符合条件的，广电总局予以颁发《信息网络传播视听节目许可证》。
&&& 第十一条 负责受理的广播电视行政部门应按照行政许可法规定的期限和权限，履行受理、审核职责。申请人的申请符合法定标准的，有权作出决定的广播电视行政部门应作出准予行政许可的书面决定。依法作出不予行政许可决定的，应当书面通知申请人并说明理由。
&&& 第十二条 《信息网络传播视听节目许可证》有效期为二年。有效期届满，需继续从事信息网络传播视听节目业务的，应于期满六个月前按本办法规定的审批程序办理续办手续。
&&& 第十三条 获得《信息网络传播视听节目许可证》的机构（以下简称持证机构）应当按照《信息网络传播视听节目许可证》载明的开办主体、业务类别、标识、传播方式、传输网络、传播载体、传播范围、接收终端、节目类别和集成内容等事项从事信息网络传播视听节目业务。
&&& 第十四条 持证机构变更注册资本、股东和持股比例及许可证载明的开办主体、业务类别、标识、传播方式、传播载体、传播范围、接收终端、节目类别和集成内容等事项的，应提前六十日报广电总局批准并办理许可证登载事项变更手续。
&&& 持证机构地址、网址、网站名、法定代表人等事项发生变更的，应当在变更后三十日内向广电总局备案并办理许可证登载事项变更手续。
&&& 第十五条 持证机构应当在领取《信息网络传播视听节目许可证》九十日内开通业务。如因特殊理由不能如期开通，应经发证机关同意，否则按终止业务处理。
&&& 第十六条 持有《信息网络传播视听节目许可证》的机构需终止业务的，应提前六十日向原发证机关申报，其《信息网络传播视听节目许可证》由原发证机关予以公告注销。
第三章 业务监管
&&& 第十七条 用于通过信息网络向公众传播的新闻类视听节目，限于境内广播电台、电视台、广播电视台以及经批准的新闻网站制作、播放的节目。
&&& 用于通过信息网络向公众传播的影视剧类视听节目，必须取得《电视剧发行许可证》、《电影公映许可证》。
&&& 第十八条 通过信息网络传播视听节目，应符合《著作权法》的规定。
&&& 第十九条 禁止通过信息网络传播有以下内容的视听节目：
&&& （一）反对宪法确定的基本原则的；
&&& （二）危害国家统一、主权和领土完整的；
&&& （三）泄露国家秘密、危害国家安全或者损害国家荣誉和利益的；
&&& （四）煽动民族仇恨、民族歧视，破坏民族团结，或者侵害民族风俗、习惯的；
&&& （五）宣扬邪教、迷信的；
&&& （六）扰乱社会秩序，破坏社会稳定的；
&&& （七）宣扬淫秽、赌博、暴力或者教唆犯罪的；
&&& （八）侮辱或者诽谤他人，侵害他人合法权益的；
&&& （九）危害社会公德或者民族优秀文化传统的；
&&& （十）有法律、行政法规和国家规定禁止的其他内容的。
&&& 第二十条 持证机构应建立健全节目审查、安全播出的管理制度，实行节目总编负责制，配备节目审查员，对其播放的节目内容进行审查。
&&& 第二十一条 信息网络的经营机构不得向未持有《信息网络传播视听节目许可证》的机构提供与传播视听节目业务有关的服务。
&&& 第二十二条 传播视听节目的名称、内容概要、播出时间、时长、来源等信息，持证机构应当至少保留三十日。
&&& 第二十三条 利用信息网络转播视听节目，只能转播广播电台、电视台播出的广播电视节目，不得转播非法开办的广播电视节目，不得转播境外广播电视节目。
&&& 利用信息网络链接或集成视听节目，只能链接或集成取得《信息网络传播视听节目许可证》机构开办的视听节目，不得链接或集成境外互联网站的视听节目。
&&& 第二十四条 省级以上广播电视行政部门应设立视听节目监控系统、建立公众监督举报制度，加强对信息网络传播视听节目的监督管理。
&&& 持证机构应当为视听节目监控系统提供必要的信号接入条件。
第四章 罚 则
&&& 第二十五条 违反本办法规定，未经批准，擅自从事信息网络传播视听节目业务的，由县级以上广播电视行政部门予以取缔，可以并处一万元以上三万元以下的罚款；构成犯罪的，依法追究刑事责任。
&&& 第二十六条 违反本办法规定，有下列行为之一的，由县级以上广播电视行政部门责令停止违法活动、给予警告、限期整改，可以并处三万元以下的罚款：构成犯罪的，依法追究刑事责任。
&&& （一）未按《信息网络传播视听节目许可证》载明的事项从事信息网络传播视听节目业务的；
&&& （二）未经批准，擅自变更许可证载明事项、持证机构注册资本、股东和持股比例；
&&& （三）违反本办法第十六条、第十八条规定的；
&&& （四）传播本办法第十九条规定禁止传播的视听节目的；
&&& （五）向未持有《信息网络传播视听节目许可证》的机构提供与传播视听节目业务有关服务的；
&&& （六）未按规定保留视听节目播放记录的；
&&& （七）利用信息网络转播境外广播电视节目，转播非法开办的广播电视节目的；
&&& （八）非法链接、集成境外广播电视节目以及非法链接、集成境外网站传播的视听节目的。
&&& 第二十七条 违反本办法规定，开办机构的法定代表人、节目总编或节目审查员未履行应尽职责，出现三次以上违规内容的，省级以上广播电视行政部门对开办机构予以警告，可以并处一千元以下罚款。
第五章 附 则
&&& 第二十八条 本办法实施前已领取《网上传播视听节目许可证》的机构，应在本办法实施之日起六个月内按照本办法规定申换许可证。
&&& 第二十九条 本办法自2004年10月11日起施行。广电总局《互联网等信息网络传播视听节目管理办法》（广电总局令第15号）同时废止。
(责任编辑：李玉东)
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承办：吉林省工业和信息化厅信息中心
技术支持：长春吉大正元信息技术股份有限公司 技术支持当前位置: >
诸城：办理新农保为何要缴50元“手续费”
来源:潍坊电视台
新型农村社会养老保险简称新农保，年满60周岁、未享受城镇职工基本养老保险待遇的农村有户籍的老年人，可以按月领取养老金。这是国家出台的政策，办理时本不需要缴纳费用，可是在诸城市林家村镇万家庄社区南王家夼村年满60岁的村民在办理这个业务时，却缴纳了50元的手续费，这到底是为什么呢？记者来到了诸城市林家村镇万家庄社区南王家夼村了解情况。记者：您今年多大了？村民：64。&记者：办这个保险了没？&村民：办了，要了50块钱。只要是办这个，就必须交50元。&记者：你从什么时候开始办的？村民： 我是61岁开始办的 。记者：你有没有去了解了解办这个新农保，具体有个什么流程？村民： 我也没问这个事 。记者：就是村里下来收你就交？村民：&嗯， 当时他收说是也不光是我自己，都是一个人50块钱。
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【案例报告】情势变更原则在专利行政诉讼案件中也可以适用
作者： 来源： 日期： 14:15:02
情势变更原则在专利行政诉讼案件中也可以适用
——陕西建工第八建设集团有限公司因不服西安市知识产权局作出的侵害专利权处理决定行政行为纠纷案
【判决要点】
情势变更原则作为一般的法律原则，虽非行政诉讼法规定的原则之一，但在侵害专利权行政诉讼案件中，专利权作为一种私权，具有民事权利的法律属性，专利行政管理机关处理的是当事人之间因民事权益产生的纠纷，案件本身具有特殊性。如果人民法院仅仅将行政机关的具体行政行为合法性作为审理侵害专利权行政案件的审查标准，忽视已经发生变化的客观事实，显然对当事人不公平，也会影响民事案件的审理，因此侵害专利权行政诉讼案件中对情势变更原则也应予以适用。
原告：陕西建工第八建设集团有限公司
被告：西安市知识产权局
第三人：黄素清
来源：陕西省中级人民法院(2016)陕01民初59号行政判决书
【案情简介】
2013年3月4日，黄素清向国家知识产权局申请了名为“架板”的实用新型专利，日，国家知识产权局授予黄素清“架板”的实用新型专利权，专利号为ZL.2。日黄素清以陕建八公司未经许可，使用其专利产品构成侵权为由，向西安市知识产权局请求处理要求陕建八公司立即停止侵权行为，公开赔礼道歉，消除影响并赔偿经济损失含合理支出共计人民币20万元。
2015年5月25日西安市知识产权局作出处理决定：1.被请求人陕建八公司立即停止使用侵犯请求人黄素清ZL.2号“架板”实用新型专利权的产品；2.已经使用及尚未使用的侵权产品不得以任何形式投放市场，并予以封存销毁；3.不支持请求人其他请求事项。决定作出后，陕建八公司不服，提起行政诉讼。期间，国家知识产权局专利复审委员会宣告.2号专利权全部无效，该决定已生效。
西安市中级人民法院审理后判决：撤销西安市知识产权局西知法处字[2015]9号专利侵权纠纷案件处理决定。
【判决观察】
一审法院认为，本案争议的焦点问题是：
一、关于陕建八公司起诉时是否已超过法定起诉期间的问题。
根据本院查明的事实，在专利法规定的提起行政诉讼的期限15日内，陕建八公司因为不服西安知产局作出的[2015]9号《专利侵权纠纷案件处理决定书》，提起了行政诉讼。西安知产局主张陕建八公司未在法定期限内提起行政诉讼而丧失诉权，本院不予支持。
二、关于西安知产局的行政处理决定是否违反法定程序的问题
本院认为，西安知产局作为西安市管理专利工作的部门，有权处理专利侵权纠纷。[2015]9号《专利侵权纠纷案件处理决定书》虽然书写中遗漏了陕建八公司的代理人李弘，但李弘参加了行政处理阶段的口审，李弘口审中的意见，在处理决定书中也有表述，故并未损害陕建八公司的合法权益。陕建八公司是否系善意使用者及提供产品来源是否合法，按照当时的法律规定，并非行政处理阶段案件的争议焦点。至于陕建八公司主张西安知产局拒绝第三人参与庭审，违反法定程序的理由，因无法律依据，本院不予采信。综上，陕建八公司提出的西安知产局行政处理程序违法的主张，因事实和法律依据不足，本院不予支持。
三、关于西安知产局行政处理决定认定证据是否确凿的问题
根据本院查明的事实，日，西安知产局进行了现场勘验并提取了证据，陕建八公司对被控侵权产品落入ZL.2“架板”实用新型专利权利要求1的保护范围，并无异议。因此，西安知产局作出的行政处理决定认定证据确凿。
四、关于行政处理决定适用法律、法规是否正确的问题
西安知产局根据《中华人民共和国专利法》第五十九条第一款“发明或者实用新型专利权的保护范围以其权利要求的内容为准，说明书及附图可以用于解释权利要求的内容”、第六十条“未经专利权人许可，实施其专利，即侵犯其专利权，引起纠纷的，由当事人协商解决；不愿协商或者协商不成的，专利权人或者利害关系人可以向人民法院起诉，也可以请求管理专利工作的部门处理。管理专利工作的部门处理时，认定侵权行为成立的，可以责令侵权人立即停止侵权行为，当事人不服的，可以自收到处理通知之日起十五日内依照《中华人民共和国行政诉讼法》向人民法院起诉”，适用《最高人民法院关于审理侵犯专利权纠纷案件应用法律若干问题的解释》第七条“人民法院判定被诉侵权技术方案是否落入专利权的保护范围，应当审查权利人主张的权利要求所记载的全部技术特征。被诉侵权技术方案包含与权利要求记载的全部技术特征相同或者等同的技术特征的，人民法院应当认定其落入专利权的保护范围；被诉侵权技术方案的技术特征与权利要求记载的全部技术特征相比，缺少权利要求记载的一个以上的技术特征，或者有一个以上技术特征不相同也不等同的，人民法院应当认定其没有落入专利权的保护范围”对本案处理适用法律并无不当。
五、关于本案是否适用情势变更原则的问题
情势变更原则作为一般的法律原则，虽非行政诉讼法规定的原则之一，但在专利侵权行政诉讼中，专利权作为一种私权，具有民事权利的法律属性，专利行政管理机关处理的是当事人之间因民事权益产生的纠纷，案件本身具有特殊性。如果人民法院仅仅将行政机关的具体行政行为合法性作为审理专利侵权行政案件的审查标准，忽视已经发生变化的客观事实，显然对当事人不公平，也会影响民事案件的审理，更不符合专利法保护专利权人利益的立法宗旨，因此专利侵权案件行政诉讼中对情势变更原则也应予以适用。
在行政诉讼中适用情势变更原则应当具备的要件是：有发生情势变更的事实；情势变更须发生在被诉行政行为作出之后终审判决之前；不适用情势变更原则显失公平；情势变更的发生不可归责于当事人且当事人无过错。根据本院查明的事实，日西安知产局作出西知法处字[2015]9号专利侵权纠纷案件处理决定后，国家知识产权局专利复审委员会于日作出第28432号无效宣告请求审查决定书决定：宣告.2号实用新型的专利权全部无效。由此事实证明，西安知产局作出专利侵权纠纷案件处理决定后，黄素清请求保护的争讼之实用新型专利的专利权已经被全部宣告无效，西安知产局作出专利侵权纠纷案件处理决定的事实依据已经发生变化，判决维持西安知产局的上述决定显然对被控侵权人不公平，且情势变更的发生不可归责于当事人。
虽然对于具体行政行为合法性的审查原则上应以作出行政行为时所依据的事实为准，但在诉讼过程中出现了请求保护的专利权利要求被宣告无效的新情况，仅考虑被诉具体行政行为时的事实情况，对已经可能影响诉争专利无效的事实不予考虑，显然与以事实为依据的法律原则相悖。因此人民法院应尊重事实，避免因机械性适用法律导致裁判错误。基于专利侵权行政诉讼案件既要对具体行政行为合法性进行审查，也要对当事人合法诉求予以实质性解决，人民法院对已经作出的行政处理决定，应根据相应的事实依据已经发生变化的情形进行审查，并依法作出裁决。
综上，西安知产局在对本案作出处理决定时，虽未有不妥，但本院根据情势变更原则，依据新事实判决如下：
撤销西安市知识产权局于日作出的西知法处字[2015]9号专利侵权纠纷案件处理决定。
1、本报告基于研究价值和参考意义而选择编辑了部分案例，但这并不代表本报告赞同法院的观点及其判决结果；
2、本报告在对判决书或新闻资讯进行选摘编辑时，有可能存在错讹或误解，欢迎与我们联系；
3、本报告将定期在电子版《知识产权案例资讯》中选登，请点击阅读原文订阅案例资讯。
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作者： 来源： 日期： 16:42:56
者：劳伦斯 · 莱斯格 译者：上海知识产权研究所 傅钢
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The Internet Under Siege
/issue_novdec_2001/lessig.html
Foreign Policy Magazine, Nov./Dec.2001
Who owns the Internet? Until recently, nobody. That's because, although the Internet was "Made in the U.S.A.," its unique design transformed it into a resource for innovation that anyone in the world could use. Today, however, courts and corporations are attempting to wall off portions of cyberspace. In so doing, they are destroying the Internet's potential to foster democracy and economic growth worldwide.
By Lawrence Lessig
The Internet revolution has ended just as surprisingly as it began. None expected the explosion of creativity that
few expected that explosion to collapse as quickly and profoundly as it has. The phenomenon has the feel of a shooting star, flaring unannounced across the night sky, then disappearing just as unexpectedly. Under the guise of protecting private property, a series of new laws and regulations are dismantling the very architecture that made the
Internet a framework for global innovation.
Neither the appearance nor disappearance of this revolution is difficult to understand. The difficulty is in accepting the lessons of the Internet's evolution. The Internet was born in the United States, but its success grew out of notions that seem far from the modern American ideals of property and the market. Americans are captivated by the idea, as explained by Yale Law School professor Carol Rose, that the world is best managed "when divided among private owners" and when the market perfectly regulates those divided resources. But the Internet took off precisely because core resources were not "divided among private owners." Instead, the core resources of the Internet were left in a "commons." It was this commons that engendered the extraordinary innovation that the Internet has seen. It is the enclosure of this commons that will bring about the Internet's demise.
This commons was built into the very architecture of the original network. Its design secured a right of decentralized innovation. It was this "innovation commons" that produced the diversity of creativity that the network has seen within the United States and, even more dramatically, abroad. Many of the Internet innovations we now take for granted (not the least of which is the World Wide Web) were the creations of "outsiders"―foreign inventors who freely roamed the commons. Policymakers need to understand the importance of this architectural design to the innovation and creativity of the original network. The potential of the Internet has just begun to be realized, especially in the developing world, where many "real space" alternatives for commerce and innovation are neither free nor open.
Yet old ways of thinking are reasserting themselves within the United States to modify this design.
Changes to the Internet's original core will in turn threaten the network's potential everywhere―staunching the opportunity for innovation and creativity. Thus, at the moment this transformation could have a meaningful effect, a counterrevolution is succeeding in undermining the potential of this network.&
The motivation for this counterrevolution is as old as revolutions themselves. As Niccolò Machiavelli described long before the Internet, "Innovation makes enemies of all those who prospered under the old regime, and only lukewarm support is forthcoming from those who would prosper under the new." And so it is today with us. Those who prospered under the old regime are threatened by the Internet. Those who would prosper under the new regime have not risen to defen whether they will is still a question. So far, it appears they will not.
The Neutral Zone
A "commons" is a resource to which everyone within a relevant community has equal access. It is a resource that is not, in an important sense, "controlled." Private or state-owned property is a only as the owner specifies may that property be used. But a commons is not subject to this sort of control. Neutral or equal restrictions may apply to it (an entrance fee to a park, for example) but not the restrictions of an owner. A commons, in this sense, leaves its resources "free."
Commons are features of all cultures. They have been especially important to cultures outside the United States―from communal tenure systems in Switzerland and Japan to irrigation communities within the Philippines. But within American intellectual culture, commons are treated as imperfect resources. They are the object of "tragedy," as ecologist Garrett Hardin famously described. Wherever a commons exists, the aim is to enclose it. In the American psyche, commons are unnecessary vestiges from times past and best removed, if possible.
For most resources, for most of the time, the bias against commons makes good sense. When resources are left in common, individuals may be driven to overconsume, and therefore deplete, them. But for some resources, the bias against commons is blinding. Some resources are not subject to the "tragedy of the commons" because some resources cannot be "depleted." (No matter how much we use Einstein's theories of relativity or copy Robert Frost's poem "New Hampshire," those resources will survive.) For these resources, the challenge is to induce provision, not to avoid depletion. The problems of provision are very different from the problems of depletion―confusing the two only leads to misguided policies.
This confusion is particularly acute when considering the Internet. At the core of the Internet is a design (chosen without a clear sense of its consequences) that was new among large-scale computer and communications networks. Named the "end-to-end argument" by network theorists Jerome Saltzer, David Clark, and David Reed in 1984, this design influences where "intelligence" in the network is placed. Traditional computer-communications systems located intelligence, and hence control, within the network itself. Networks were "smart"; they were designed by people who believed they knew exactly what the network would be used for.
But the Internet was born at a time when a different philosophy was taking shape within computer science. This philosophy ranked humility above omniscience and anticipated that network designers would have no clear idea about all the ways the network could be used. It therefore counseled a design that built little into the network itself, leaving the network free to develop as the ends (the applications) wanted.
The motivation for this new design was flexibility. The consequence was innovation. Because innovators needed no permission from the network owner before different applications or content got served across the network, innovators were freer to develop new modes of connection. Technically, the network achieved this design simply by focusing on the delivery of packets of data, oblivious to either the contents of the packets or their owners. Nor does the network concern itself that all the packets make their way to the other side. The network is "best efforts"; anything more is provided by the applications at both ends. Like an efficient post office (imagine!), the system simply forwards the data along.
Since the network was not optimized for any single application or service, the Internet remained open to new innovation. The World Wide Web is perhaps the best example. The Web was the creation of computer scientist Tim Berners-Lee at the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) laboratory in Geneva in late 1990. Berners-Lee wanted to enable users on a
network to have easy access to documents located elsewhere on the network. He therefore developed a set of protocols to enable hypertext links among documents located across the network. Because of end-to-end, these protocols could be layered on top of the initial protocols of the Internet. This meant the Internet could grow to embrace the Web. Had the network compromised its commitment to end-to-end―had its design been optimized to favor telephony, for example, as many in the 1980s wanted―then the Web would not have been possible.
This end-to-end design is the "core" of the Internet. If we can think of the network as built in layers, then the end-to-end design was created by a set of protocols implemented at the middle layer―what we might call the logical, or code layer, of the Internet. Below the code layer is a physical layer (computers and the wires that link them). Above the code layer is a content layer (material that gets served across the network). Not all these layers were organized as commons. The computers at the physical layer are private property, not "free" in the sense of a commons. Much of the content served across the network is protected by copyright. It, too, is not "free."
At the code layer, however, the Internet is a commons. By design, no one controls the resources for innovation that get served across this layer. Individuals control the physical layer, deciding whether a machine or network gets connected to the Internet. But once connected, at least under the Internet's original design, the innovation resources for the network remained free.
No other large scale network left the code layer free in this way. For most of the history of telephone monopolies worldwide, permission to innovate on the telephone platform was vigorously controlled. In the United States in 1956, AT&T successfully persuaded the U.S. Federal Communications Commission to block the use of a plastic cup on a telephone receiver, designed to block noise from the telephone microphone, on the theory that AT&T alone had the right to innovation on the telephone network.
The Internet might have remained an obscure tool of government-backed researchers if the telephone company had maintained this control. The Internet would never have taken off if ordinary individuals had been unable to connect to the network by way of Internet service providers (ISPs) through already existing telephone lines. Yet this right to connect was not preordained. It is here that an accident in regulatory history played an important role. Just at the moment the Internet was emerging, the telephone monopoly was being moved to a different regulatory paradigm. Previously, the telephone monopoly was essentially free to control its wires as it wished. Beginning in the late 1960s, and then more vigorously throughout the 1980s, the government began to require that the telephone industry behave neutrally―first by insisting that telephone companies permit customer premises equipment (such as modems) to be connected to the network, and then by requiring that telephone companies allow others to have access to their wires.
This kind of regulation was rare among telecommunications monopolies worldwide. In Europe and throughout the world, telecommunications monopolies were permitted to control the uses of their networks. No requirement of access operated to enable competition. Thus no system of competition grew up around these other monopolies. But when the United States broke up AT&T in 1984, the resulting companies no longer had the freedom to discriminate against other uses of their lines. And when ISPs sought access to the local Bell lines to enable customers to connect to the Internet, the local Bells were required to grant access equally. This enabled a vigorous competition in Internet access, and this competition meant that the network could not behave strategically against this new technology. In effect, through a competitive market, an end-to-end design was created at the physical layer of the telephone network, which meant that an end-to-end design could be layered on top of that.
This innovation commons was thus layered onto a physical infrastructure that, through regulation, had mportant commons-like features. Common-carrier regulation of the telephone system assured that the system could not discriminate against an emerging competitor, the Internet. And the Internet itself was created, through its end-to-end design, to assure that no particular application or use could discriminate against any other innovations. Neutrality existed at the physical and code layer of the Internet.
An important neutrality also existed at the content layer of the Internet. This layer includes all the
content streamed across the network―Web pages, MP3s, e-mail, streaming video―as well as application programs that run on, or feed, the network. These programs are distinct from the protocols at the code layer, collectively referred to as TCP/IP (including the protocols of the World Wide Web). TCP/IP is dedicated to the public domain.
But the code above these protocols is not in the public domain. It is, instead, of two sorts: proprietary and nonproprietary. The proprietary includes the familiar Microsoft operating systems and Web servers, as well as programs from other software companies. The nonproprietary includes open source and free software, especially the Linux (or GNU/Linux) operating system, the Apache server, as well as a host of other plumbing-oriented code that makes the Net run.
Nonproprietary code creates a commons at the content layer. The commons here is not just the resource that a particular program might provide―for example, the functionality of an operating system or Web server. The commons also includes the source code of software that can be drawn upon and modified by others. Open source and free software ("open code" for short) must be distributed with the source code. The source code must be free for others to take and modify. This
commons at the content layer means that others can take and build upon open source and free software. It also means that open code can't be captured and tilted against any particular competitor. Open code can always be modified by subsequent adopters. It, therefore, is licensed to remain neutral among subsequent uses. There is no "owner" of an open code project.
In this way, and again, parallel to the end-to-end principle at the code layer, open code decentralizes innovation. It keeps a platform neutral. This neutrality in turn inspires innovators to build for that platform because they need not fear the platform will turn against them. Open code builds a commons for innovation at the content layer. Like the commons at the code layer, open code preserves the opportunity for innovation and protects innovation against the strategic behavior of competitors. Free resources induce innovation.
An Engine of Innovation
The original Internet, as it was extended to society generally, mixed controlled and free resources at each layer of the network. At the core code layer, the network was free. The end-to-end design assured that no network owner could exercise control over the network. At the physical layer, the resources were essentially controlled, but even here, important aspects were free. One had the right to connect a machine to the network or not, but telephone companies didn't have the right to discriminate against this particular use of their network. And finally, at the content layer, many of the resources served across the Internet were controlled. But a crucial range of software building essential services on the Internet remained free. Whether through an open source or free software license, these resources could not be controlled.
This balance of control and freedom produced an unprecedented explosion in innovation. The power, and hence the right, to innovate was essentially decentralized. The Internet might have been an American invention, but creators from around the world could build upon this network platform. Significantly, some of the most important innovations for the Internet came from these "outsiders."
As noted, the most important technology for accessing and browsing the Internet (the World Wide Web) was not invented by companies specializing in network access. It wasn't America Online (AOL) or Compuserve. The Web was developed by a researcher in a Swiss laboratory who first saw its potential and then fought to bring it to fruition. Likewise, it wasn't existing e-mail providers who came up with the idea of Web-based e-mail. That was co-created by an immigrant to the United States from India, Sabeer Bhatia, and it gave birth to one of the fastest growing communities in history―Hotmail.
And it wasn't traditional network providers or telephone companies that invented the applications
that enabled online chatting to take off. The original community-based chatting service (ICQ) was the invention of an Israeli, far from the trenches of network design. His service could explode (and then be purchased by AOL for $400 million) only because the network was left open for this type of innovation.
Similarly, the revolution in bookselling initiated
(through the use of technologies that "match preferences" of customers) was invented far from the traditional organs of publishers. By gathering a broad range of data about purchases by customers, Amazon―drawing upon technology first developed at MIT and the University of Minnesota to filter Usenet news―can predict what a customer is likely to want. These recommendations drive sales, but without the high cost of advertising or promotion. Consequently, booksellers such as Amazon can outcompete traditional marketers of books, which may account for the rapid expansion of Amazon into Asia and Europe.
These innovations are at the level of Internet services. Far more profound have been innovations at
the level of content. The Internet has not only inspired invention, it has also inspired publication
in a way that would never have been produced by the world of existing publishers. The creation of online archives of lyrics and chord sequences and of collaborative databases collecting information about compact discs and movies demonstrates the kind of creativity that was possible because the right to create was not controlled.
Again, the innovations have not been limited to the United States. OpenDemocracy.org, for example, is a London-based, Web-centered forum for debate and exchange about democracy and governance throughout the world. Such a forum is possible only because no coordination among international actors is needed. And it thrives because it can engender debate at a low cost.
This history should be a lesson. Every significant innovation on the Internet has emerged outside of traditional providers. The new grows away from the old. This trend teaches the value of leaving the platform open for innovation. Unfortunately, that platform is now under siege. Every technological disruption creates winners and losers. The losers have an interest in avoiding that disruption if they can. This was the lesson Machiavelli taught, and it is the experience with every important technological change over time. It is also what we are now seeing with the Internet. The innovation commons of the Internet threatens important and powerful pre-Internet interests. During the past five years, those interests have mobilized to launch a counterrevolution that is now having a global impact.
This movement is fueled by pressure at both the physical and content layers of the network. These
changes, in turn, put pressure on the freedom of the code layer. These changes will have an effect on the opportunity for growth and innovation that the Internet presents. Policymakers keen to protect that growth should be skeptical of changes that will threaten it. Broad-based innovation may threaten the profits of some existing interests, but the social gains from this unpredictable growth will far outstrip the private losses, especially in nations just beginning to connect.
Fencing Off& the Commons
The Internet took off on telephone lines. Narrowband service across acoustic modems enabled millions of computers to connect through thousands of ISPs. Local telephone service providers had to provide ISPs with a they were not permitted to discriminate against Internet service. Thus the physical platform on which the Internet was born was regulated to remain neutral. This regulation had an important effect. A nascent industry could be born on the telephone wires, regardless of the desires of telephone companies.
But as the Internet moves from narrowband to broadband, the regulatory environment is changing. The dominant broadband technology in the United States is currently cable. Cable lives under a different regulatory regime. Cable providers in general have no obligation to grant access to their facilities. And cable has asserted the right to discriminate in the Internet service it provides.
Consequently, cable has begun to push for a different set of principles at the code layer of the network. Cable companies have deployed technologies to enable them to engage in a form of discrimination in the service they provide. Cisco, for example, developed "policy-based routers" that enable cable companies to choose which content flows quickly and which flows slowly. With these, and other technologies, cable companies will be in a position to exercise power over the content and applications that operate on their networks.
This control has already begun in the United States. ISPs running cable services have exercised their power to ban certain kinds of applications (specifically, those that enable peer-to-peer service). They have blocked particular content (advertising from competitors, for example) when that content was not consistent with their business model. The model for these providers is the model of cable television generally―controlling access and content to the cable providers' end.
The environment of innovation on the original network will change according to the extent that cable becomes the primary mode of access to the Internet. Rather than a network that vests intelligence in the ends, the cable-dominated network will vest an increasing degree of intelligence within the network itself. And to the extent it does this, the network will increase the opportunity for strategic behavior in favor of some technologies and against others. An essential feature of neutrality at the code layer will have been compromised, reducing the opportunity for innovation worldwide.
Far more dramatic, however, has been the pressure from the content layer on the code layer. This pressure has come in two forms. First, and most directly related to the content described above, there has been an explosion of patent regulation in the context of software. Second, copyright holders have exercised increasing control over new technologies for distribution.
The changes in patent regulation are more difficult to explain, though the consequence is not hard to track. Two decades ago, the U.S. Patent Office began granting patents for software-like inventions. In the late 1990s, the court overseeing these patents finally approved the practice and approved their extension to "business methods." The European Union (EU), meanwhile, initially adopted a more skeptical attitude toward software patents. But pressure from the United States will eventually bring the EU into alignment with American policy.
In principle, these patents are designed to spur innovation. But with sequential and complementary
innovation, little evidence exists that suggests such patents will do any good, and there is increasing evidence that they will do harm. Like any regulation, patents tax the innovative process generally. As with any tax, some firms―large rather than small, U.S. rather than foreign―are better able to bear that tax than others. Open code projects, in particular, are threatened by this trend, as they are least able to negotiate appropriate patent licenses.
The most dramatic restrictions on innovation, however, have come at the hands of copyright holders. Copyright is designed to ensure that artists control their "writings" for a limited time. The aim is to secure to copyright holders a sufficient interest to produce new work. But copyright laws were crafted in an era long before the Internet. And their effect on the Internet has been to transfer control over innovation in distribution from many innovators to a concentrated few.
The clearest example of this effect is online music. Before the Internet, the production and distribution of music had become extraordinarily concentrated. In 2000, for example, five companies controlled 84 percent of music distribution in the world. The reasons for this concentration are many―including the high costs of promotion―but the effect of concentration on artist development is profound. Very few artists make any money from their work, and the few that do are able to do so because of mass marketing from record labels. The Internet had the potential to change this reality. Both because the costs of distribution were so low, and because the
network also had the potential to significantly lower the costs of promotion, the cost of music could fall, and revenues to artists could rise.
Five years ago, this market took off. A large number of online music providers began competing for new ways to distribute music. Some distributed MP3s for money (). Some built technology for giving owners of music easier access to their music (). And some made it much easier for ordinary users to "share" their music with other users (Napster). But as quickly
as these companies took off, lawyers representing old media succeeded in shutting them down. These lawyers argued that copyright law gave the holders (some say hoarders) of these copyrights the exclusive right to control how they get used. American courts agreed.
To keep this dispute in context, we should think about the last example of a technological change that facilitated a much different model for distributing content: cable TV, which has been accurately hailed as the first great Napster. Owners of cable television systems essentially set up antenna and "stole" over-the-air broadcasts and then sold that "stolen property" to their customers. But when U.S. courts were asked to stop this "theft," they refused. Twice the U.S. Supreme Court held that this use of someone else's copyrighted material was not inconsistent with copyright law.
When the U.S. Congress finally got around to changing the law, it struck an importantly illustrative balance. Congress granted copyright owners the right to compensation from the use of their material on cable broadcasts, but cable companies were given the right to broadcast the copyrighted material. The reason for this balance is not hard to see. Copyright owners certainly are entitled to compensation for their work. But the right to compensation shouldn't translate into the power to control innovation. Rather than giving copyright holders the right to veto a particular new use of their work (in this case, because it would compete with over-the-air broadcasting), Congress assured copyright owners would get paid without having the power to control―compensation without control.
The same deal could have been struck by Congress in the context of online music. But this time, the courts did not hesitate to extend control to the copyright holders. So the concentrated holders of these copyrights were able to stop the deployment of competing distributors. And Congress was not motivated to respond by granting an equivalent compulsory right. The aim of the recording company's strategy was plain enough: shut down these new and competing models of distribution and replace them with a model for distributing music online more consistent with the traditional model.
This trend has been supported by the actions of Congress. In 1998, Congress passed the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), which (in)famously banned technologies designed to circumvent copyright protection technologies and also created strong incentives for ISPs to remove from their sites any material claimed to be a violation of copyright.
On the surface both changes seem sensible enough. Copyright protection technologies are analogous to locks. What right does anyone have to pick a lock? And ISPs are in the best position to assure that copyright violations don't occur on their Web sites. Why not create incentives for them to remove infringing copyrighted material?
But intuitions here mislead. A copyright protection technology is just code that controls access to
copyrighted material. But that code can restrict access more effectively (and certainly less subtly)
than copyright law does. Often the desire to crack protection systems is nothing more than a desire to exercise what is sometimes called a fair-use right over the copyrighted material. Yet the DMCA bans that technology, regardless of its ultimate effect.
More troubling, however, is that the DMCA effectively bans this technology on a worldwide basis. Russian programmer Dimitry Sklyarov, for example, wrote code to crack Adobe's eBook technology in order to enable users to move eBooks from one machine to another and to give blind consumers the ability to "read" out loud the books they purchased. The code Sklyarov wrote was legal where it was written, but when it was sold by his company in the United States, it became illegal. When he came to the United States in July 2001 to talk about that code, the FBI arrested him. Today Sklyarov faces a sentence of 25 years for writing code that could be used for fair-use purposes, as well as to violate copyright laws.
Similar trouble has arisen with the provision that gives ISPs the incentive to take down infringing
copyrighted material. When an ISP is notified that material on its site violates copyright, it can avoid liability if it removes the material. As it doesn't have any incentive to expose itself to liability, the ordinary result of such notification is for the ISP to remove the material. Increasingly, companies trying to protect themselves from criticism have used this provision to silence critics. In August 2001, for example, a British pharmaceutical company invoked the DMCA in order to force an ISP to shut down an animal rights site that criticized the British company. Said the ISP, "It's very clear [the British company] just wants to shut them up," but ISPs have no incentive to
resist the claims.&
In all these cases, there is a common pattern. In the push to give copyright owners control over their content, copyright holders also receive the ability to protect themselves against innovations that might threaten existing business models. The law becomes a tool to assure that new innovations don't displace old ones―when instead, the aim of copyright and patent law should be, as the U.S. Constitution requires, to "promote the progress of science and useful arts."
These regulations will not only affect Americans. The expanding jurisdiction that American courts claim, combined with the push by the World Intellectual Property Organization to enact similar legislation elsewhere, means that the impact of this sort of control will be felt worldwide. There is no "local" when it comes to corruption of the Internet's basic principles. As these changes weaken the open source and free software movements, countries with the most to gain from a free and open platform lose. Those affected will include nations in the developing world and nations that do not want to cede control to a single private corporation. And as content becomes more controlled, nations that could otherwise benefit from vigorous competition in the delivery and production of content will also lose. An explosion of innovation to deliver MP3s would directly translate into innovation to deliver telephone calls and video content. Lowering the cost of this medium would dramatically benefit nations that still suffer from weak technical infrastructures.
Policymakers around the world must recognize that the interests most strongly protected by the Internet counterrevolution are not their own. They should be skeptical of legal mechanisms that enable those most threatened by the innovation commons to resist it. The Internet promised the world―particularly the weakest in the world―the fastest and most dramatic change to existing barriers to growth. That promise depends on the network remaining open to innovation. That openness depends upon policy that better understands the Internet's past.
Lawrence Lessig is professor of law at Stanford University. He is author of The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in the Connected World (New York: Random House, 2001) and Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books, 1999).
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